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Abstract'! !!!In!order!for!a!deterrence!policy!to!be!effective!and!credible,!there!needs!to!be!a!successful!application!of!certain!fundamental!principles.!Of!these,!one!of!the!most! important! is! perception.! Perception,! in! this! context,! is! defined! as! the!neurological!process!of!observation!and!interpretation.!This!dissertation!examines!the!role!of!perception!in!the!foreign!policy!making!process!during!the!Berlin!Crisis!of!1961.!The!focus!is!primarily!on!the!actions!of!the!two!protagonists!in!the!crisis,!U.S.! President! John! F.! Kennedy! and! Soviet! leader! Nikita! S.! Khrushchev.! The!dissertation! argues! that! Kennedy! embarked! upon! an! unprecedented! U.S.!deterrence! policy,! known! as! Flexible' Response,! to! bolster! his! credibility! as! an!enforcer! of! deterrence! and! a! champion! of! the! U.S.! commitment! to!Berlin.!Moreover,! it! is! suggested! that! Kennedy’s! success! in! implementing! the!
Flexible'Response!policy!in!the!context!of!a!highly!volatile!situation!was!to!a!great!extent! assisted! by! the! Soviet! leader’s! own!perception! of! Kennedy’s! resolve.! It! is!beyond!the!scope!of!this!dissertation!to!fully!assess!the!foreign!policy!strategy!of!the!U.S.!or!the!U.S.S.R.!on!the!European!continent!during!the!early!1960s.!Instead,!this!dissertation!aims!to!demonstrate!that!Kennedy!astutely!applied!the!necessary!criteria! of! a! successful! deterrence!policy.!The! evidence!of! this! success! is! seen! in!Khrushchev’s!changing!perception!of!the!American!leader!during!the!course!of!the!crisis.!This!changing!perception!was!sufficiently!credible!to!deter!the!Soviet!leader!from!sanctioning!a!separate!German!peace!treaty.! 
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deterred!from!carrying!out!an!action.6!A!deeper!exploration!of!deterrence!theory!reveals! that! complex! psychological! issues! are! involved! in! the! decision! making!process! on! both! sides.! Perception! of! another! leader’s! intentions! and! of! their!resolve!is!a!pivotal!element!of!policy\making.!Deterrence!situations!can!arise!when!these! perceptions! are! incorrect.7! For! example,! what! influences! a! potential!aggressor’s! understanding! and/or! perception! of! any! deterrence! threat?!Deterrence!policies! are!more! complex! than! simply!having! a! retaliatory! threat! in!place.! Instead,! they! involve! policies! and! actions! designed! to! ‘convince’! an!adversary! of! the! credibility! of! the! available! deterrent! while! at! the! same! time!questioning! their! perception! about! the! effectiveness! of! any! challenge.8! William!Kaufmann,!an! influential!deterrence!theorist,!has!argued!that!commitments!need!to!have!‘an!air!of!credibility’!in!order!for!deterrence!to!succeed.9!Furthermore,!the!reality! of! a! vulnerable! commitment! is! not! a! necessary! pre\condition! for! a!commitment! to! be! challenged;! rather! that! an! aggressor! has! the! perception! that!such!a!vulnerable!commitment!exists.!!This!corroborates!the!notion!that!deterrence!succeeds!or!fails!through!the!eyes! of! an! aggressor.10! As! such,! it! is! necessary! to! determine! the! essential!conditions!in!which!an!aggressor!can!be!induced!to!perceive!a!deterrence!policy!as!credible.11!!There! are! three! essential! conditions! that! emerge! from! the! study! of!deterrence! theory,! which! determine! whether! or! not! a! deterrence! policy! can! be!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.48.!7!Robert!Jervis,!Perception'and'Misperception'in'International'Politics,'Princeton,!Princeton!University!Press,!1976,!p.113.!8!Patrick!Morgan,!“Saving!Face!For!the!Sake!of!Deterrence”,!in!Psychology'and'
Deterrence,!ed.!Robert!Jervis,!Richard!Lebow,!and!Janice!Stein,!London,!The!Johns!Hopkins!University!Press,!1985,!pp.!125\152.!9!Richard!N.!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War:'The'Nature'of'International'Crisis,!London,!The!Johns!Hopkins!University!Press,!1984,!p.84.!10!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.97.!11!Patrick!Morgan,!“Saving!Face!For!the!Sake!of!Deterrence”,!p.125;!Lynne!Davis,!“Limited!Nuclear!Options”!in!Strategic'Deterrence'In'a'Changing'Environment,!ed.!!Christoph!Bertram,!The!Adelphi!Papers;!Vol.6,!1981,!p.54.!
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perceived!as!credible.!Firstly,!commitments!must!be!defined!explicitly!and!overtly!communicated.! Secondly,! a! state! must! develop! the! means! for! realistic! reprisals!and! a! defence! structure! able! to! combat! challenges.! Thirdly,! the! state! needs! to!demonstrate! resolve! to! follow! through! on! defending! commitments.12! These!essential!conditions!of!deterrence!offer!a!means!of!assessing!the!credibility!of!the!commitments! that!are!challenged.!They!also!provide!a! template! to!measure!how!those! actors! involved! perceived! the! vulnerability! of! the! commitment! they!challenged.13!!There! are! generally! considered! to! be! two! types! of! deterrence! policy,!immediate! and! general.! Immediate! deterrence! is! the! conflict! between! two!opposing!states!when!one!is!seriously!considering!a!challenge!to!their!opponent’s!commitment! whilst! the! other! is! mounting! a! retaliatory! threat! to! inhibit! the!aggressor.14!General!deterrence!refers!to!the!maintenance!of!defence!structures!in!order! to! regulate! each! party’s! intentions.15! Immediate! deterrence! can! emerge!when!a!state!unintentionally!induces!a!perception!of!weakness!and!irresolution!in!a! potential! aggressor’s! mind.! This! can! lead! to! the! aggressor! questioning! the!credibility! of! the! state’s! commitment! and! even! forming! a! belief! that! the!commitment! will! be! abandoned! when! challenged.! As! a! result,! an! immediate!deterrence!crisis!can!occur!where!general!deterrence!appears!to!be,!or!is,!about!to!fail.! In! this! context,! it! is! crucial! for! the! state! to! reassert! its! position! on! the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.84;!Henry!Kissinger,!The'Necessity'For'
Choice:'Prospects'of'American'Foreign'Policy,!New!York,!Harper,!1960,!pp.40\41;!Yehoshaat!Harkabi,!Nuclear'War'and'Nuclear'Peace,!New!Jersey,!Transaction!Publishers,!1966,!pp.9\25;!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.64;!Stephen!Maxwell,!!“Rationality!in!Deterrence”,'Adelphi'Papers,'Vol.8,!No.!50,!1968,!pp.1\19.!13!Therefore,!a!commitment!is!said!to!be!credible!when!it!is!clearly!defined,!potential!challengers!are!aware!of!its!presence!and!understand!the!risks!involved,!is!sufficiently!defended,!poses!a!formidable!threat!to!potential!challengers,!and!the!deterrer!has!demonstrated!their!resolve!to!maintain!the!status!quo.!!14!Patrick!Morgan,!Deterrence:'A'Conceptual'Analysis,!Beverly!Hills,!Sage!Library!of!Social!Science,!1983,!p.28.!15!ibid.!
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on! the! impact! that! reliance!on!deterrence!policies!has!on! the!understanding!and!the!capability!of!influencing!an!adversary’s!perceptions!on!their!own!resolve.!!Deterrence! is! largely! a! ‘context! dependent’! study,! involving! an! array! of!variables,! many! of! which! are! moderately! subjective,! that! are! highly! reliant! on!context.20!As!such,!when!assessing!the!success!of!deterrence!policies!it!is!crucial!to!examine!them!at!an!individual!case!level.!This!dissertation!will!focus!on!the!1961!Berlin! Crisis! as! a! case! study! for! examining! the! success! of! President! Kennedy’s!
Flexible'Response!deterrence!policy.!!!
Literature'Review'The!political,! economic!and!social! impacts!of! the!Cold!War!period,!which!are! still! in! evidence! today,!have!helped! to! generate! a! growing!body!of! literature!considering! the! psychology! of! foreign! policy.! Deterrence! theory! has! emerged! as!one! of! the! main! doctrines! of! the! Cold! War! era! and! the! rise! of! thermonuclear!arsenals! has! made! contributions! to! this! discipline! all! the! more! interesting! and!important.!One! of! the! earliest! scholars! of! this! subject,! William! W.! Kaufmann,!developed!an!approach!to!assessing!the!criteria!for!general!nuclear!deterrence.!In!
The'Requirements' of' Deterrence! (1954),! he! identified! three! features! that!make! a!deterrence!policy! credible:! cost,! capability! and! resolve.21!Cost! is! the! level! of! risk!that!a!‘deterrer’!has!taken!on!and!the!personal!price!of!disengagement.!Capability!is! the! ability! to! defend! a! commitment.! Resolve! is! the! demonstration! and!willingness! of! a! deterrer! to! protect! commitments! from! challenges.! Although!Kaufmann! laid! the! foundations! for! studying! deterrence! theory,! his! approach!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,'Deterrence,!p.54.!21!William!W.!Kaufmann,!The'Requirements'of'Deterrence,!Princeton,!Center!of!International!Studies,!1954,!pp.6\8.!
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lacked!a! comprehensive!assessment!of! the!decision\making!process,! the! context,!and!the!motivation!of!the!potential!aggressor.!By! the!1960s! a!new!and!deeper!understanding!of! deterrence! theory!had!developed,! assisted! by! the! scholarly! contributions! of! writers! such! as! Thomas!Schelling,! Thomas! Milburn! and! Henry! Kissinger.22! These! writers! stressed! the!importance! of! credibility! as! the! key! to! deterrent! success.! In! The' Necessity' For'
Choice' (1960)! Kissinger! sought! to! expand! Kaufmann’s! three! requirements! of!deterrence! credibility! and! the! conditions! for! successful! deterrence.! Kissinger!concluded!that! the!challenger!must!understand!the!choice!between!resisting!and!pressuring.! Furthermore,! the! challenger! should! also! be! rational! and! thus! make!decisions!based!on!self\interest.23!In!addition,!the!implementation!of!the!deterrent!threat!must!be!sufficiently!realistic!so!that!it!is!not!taken!as!a!bluff,!and!in!light!of!self\interest,! the!adversary!must!conclude!that! the!risks!outweigh!the!benefits!of!an! attack.24! These! conditions,! although! useful,! are! still! in! relation! to! general!deterrence!where!the!use!of!nuclear!weapons!is!the!main!source!of!deterrence.!It!does! not! take! into! account! the! conditions! for! implementing! a! deterrence! policy!after!general!deterrence!has!already!failed.!!In!The' Strategy' of' Conflict' (1963),! Thomas! Schelling! asserts! that! leaders!obtain! credibility! for! nuclear! deterrence! by! encouraging! a! reputation! of!irrationality.25! In! Arms' and' Influence,! he! emphasizes! the! importance! of! leaders!being!both!vague!in!defining!commitments!and!in!what!the!activation!path!of!the!policy! entails! in! order! to! enhance! that! deterrence.26! In! other! words,! ‘leaving!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22!Thomas!Schelling,!The'Strategy'of'Conflict,!Cambridge:!Harvard!University!Press,!1963;!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,!New!Haven,!Yale!University!Press,!1966;!Thomas!Milburn,!“The!Concept!of!Deterrence:!Some!Logical!and!Psychological!Considerations”,'Journal'of'Social'Science,'Vol.17,!No.3,!1960:!!3\11.!Henry!Kissinger,!The!Necessity'For'Choice.!23!Henry!Kissinger,!The'Necessity'For'Choice,!pp.40\41.!24!ibid.!!25!Thomas!Schelling,!The'Strategy'of'Conflict,'pp.187\188,!203.!26!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,!p.!42.!!
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something! to! chance’! will! create! the! uncertainty! needed! to! inhibit! adversaries!from!challenging!commitments!for!fear!of!undefined!escalation.27!Since!the!1970s,!deterrence! theorists!have! largely!dismissed! this!assessment.28! Instead,! there! is!a!greater!focus!on!the!importance!of!clarity!and!explicitness!for!deterrence!threats!to!be!viable.!This! is!most!clearly!seen! in!cases!of! immediate!deterrence!with! the!risk!of!mass!nuclear!destruction.!!In! his! later! work,!Arms' and' Influence,! Schelling! suggests! that! bargaining!becomes!necessary!in!cases!where!the!balance!of!power!is!more!equal.29!As!such,!the! process! and! the! outcome! of! bargaining! do! not! necessarily! rely! on! military!capabilities,!but!instead!on!‘bargaining!power’.!Therefore,!the!leader!who!appears!to!be!more!willing!to!suffer!physical,!emotional!and/or!economical!losses!holds!a!position!of!strength!in!achieving!the!desired!outcome,!rather!than!the!leader!who!has!the!greatest!power!to!inflict!force.30!!!Schelling’s! approach! to! deterrence! can! be! applied! to! the! psychology! of!nuclear! standoffs! where! nuclear! weapon! superiority! purely! in! numerical! terms!does! not! necessarily! mean! a! superior! bargaining! position.! This! idea! has! been!further!developed!by!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke!who!assert! that! raw!capabilities!between!the!United!States!and!the!Soviet!Union!were!not!as!important!as!their!perceptions!of!each!other’s!intentions!and!willingness!to!endure.31!!During!the!1960s!some!intellectuals!also!began!to!consider!the!limitations!of! deterrence! strategies.32! In! the! book,!The' Concept' of' Deterrence:' Some' Logical'!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27!Thomas!Schelling,!The'Strategy'of'Conflict,!Chapter!8!is!titled!“The!Threat!That!Leaves!Something!to!Chance”,!p.187.!28!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.64,!dismisses!this!and!instead!finds!that!it!is!necessary!to!communicate!explicitly!the!full!formulation!of!a!state’s!intention!to!protect!a!commitment;!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'
War,!pp.86\87,!find!that!deterrence!commitments!need!to!be!overt!and!explicit!to!be!able!to!be!successfully.!29!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,!pp.!v,!198\200.!30!ibid,!pp.1\9.!31!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.53.!32!Thomas!Milburn,!The'Concept'of'Deterrence,'p.4.!
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and' Psychological' Considerations,! Thomas!Milburn! suggests! that! deterrence! as! a!military!doctrine! can!only!exist!within!violent! confrontation.33!He!proposes! that,!below! the! threshold! of! nuclear! threats,! ‘deterrence! has! little! effect! or!significance’.34!This!assessment!on!the!limitations!of!deterrence!does!not!consider!the! possibility! of! a! flexible! deterrence! policy.! Later! works! have! stressed! the!importance!of!deterrence!policies!having!flexibility!to!meet!challengers!below!the!nuclear!threshold.35!!Building! on! Kissinger’s! conditions! for! successful! deterrence,! Yehoshafat!Harkabi! suggests! three! criteria! for! deterrence! success! in! his! work!Nuclear'War'
and' Nuclear' Peace! (1966).! The! retaliatory! threat!must! be! communicated! to! the!adversary,!the!strategy!must!have!credibility!in!order!for!the!adversary!to!believe!the!retaliation!will!be!carried!out!and!the!adversary!must!be!rational!to!reasonably!weigh!the!gains!against!the!risks!of!a!challenge.36!!Harkabi! further! divides! the! concept! of! credibility! into! intentions! and!capability,! both! of! which! need! to! be! demonstrated! and! achieved! in! order! to! be!successful! in! deterring! the! adversary.37! Christopher! Bertram! in! Strategic'




theorists,! like!Robert!McCalla! (1992),!argue! that! it! is! the!belief!of!escalation!and!belief!of!response!that!matter,!rather!than!the!reality!of!destructive!power.39!!In!Rationality'in'Deterrence'(1968),!Stephan!Maxwell!has!explored!the!idea!that!‘commitments!to!be!respected!cannot!inhibit!an!adversary’s!vital!interests’.40!This! is! of! particular! interest!when! considering! the! events! surrounding! the!1961!Berlin! Crisis.! By! not! challenging! the! construction! of! the! Berlin! Wall,! Kennedy!allowed!Khrushchev!the!opportunity!to!respect!the!U.S.!West!Berlin!Commitment!as! it! accommodated! Soviet! concerns! over! the! mass! exodus! of! East! German!refugees.41!!By! the! 1970s,! deterrence! situations! became! more! segregated.! In!




They!argue!that!when!deterrence! is!placed! in!a!wider!context,!challenges!below!overt!attacks,!described!as!‘probes’,!can!be!seen!as!attempts!by!adversaries!to!test!a!state’s!resolve.43!It!is!important!for!states!to!meet!these!probes!in!order!to!demonstrate!their!resolve!to!act!in!the!defence!of!their!commitments.!George! and! Smoke! also! focus! on! the! motivation! and! process! of! the! U.S.!government’s! long\held!strategy!of!projecting! their!deterrence!polices! to!protect!third\party!nations!by!means!of!preclusion.!They!identify!three!conditions!for!the!success!of!projecting!deterrence!policies!across!borders.!These!include!having!an!absolute!formulation!of!one’s!intent!to!protect!interests,!the!acquisition!of!means!to! back! up! this! intent! and! the! communication! of! intent! to! the! potential!challenger.44!However,!other!theorists!suggest!that!having!clear!demonstrations!of!resolve!is!the!key!to!the!successful!application!of!deterrence.45!!In! Flexibility' and' Commitments' in' International' Conflicts' (1978),! Charles!Lockhart! argues! that! a! flexible!deterrence!policy! is!not! always! contradictory.!He!contends! that! deterrence! policies! that! rely! on! their! firm! determination! not! to!submit! to! pressure! can! have! flexible! components! to! enhance! credibility.46! Glenn!Synder! and! Paul! Diesing! further! develop! this! idea! in! their!work!Conflict' Among'






applicable!to!situations!where!the!adversary!has!a!vital!share!in!the!commitment!and!as!a!result!attempts!to!change!the!status!quo!to!their!advantage.48!!!!Scholars!continue!to!debate!the!requirements!of!deterrence,!including!the!notion!that!commitments!need!to!be!defined!explicitly!and!overtly!communicated!to! adversaries.! Richard! Lebow! (1984)! stresses! the! importance! of! commitments!being! clearly! defined! and! communicated! to! adversaries! through! a! number! of!channels.49! He! argues! that! a! commitment! has! no! deterrent! value! unless! the!adversary!is!aware!of!‘the!full!scope!and!dimensions!of!the!commitment’.50!!Bruce! Russet! and! Paul! Huth! are! influential! scholars! in! the! study! of!deterrence! theory.! During! the! 1980s! they! contributed! to! the! growing! body! of!knowledge! in!works! such! as!Deterrence' Failure' and'Crisis' Escalation! (1988)! and!




little!if!challengers!doubt!the!willingness!of!defenders!to!use!them.54!!Furthermore,!in!the!case!of!nuclear!crisis,! immediate!force!in!the!form!of!conventional!warfare!acts!more!like!tripwire!that!if!crossed!carries!the!threat!of!escalation.55!As!a!result,!having!superior!conventional!forces!can!be!seen!as!outdated!as!a!requirement!for!successful!deterrence.!!!!!Robert! Jervis,! Richard! Ned! Lebow! and! Janice! Gross! Stein! have! all!contributed! to! a! deeper! understanding! of! the! psychology! of! deterrence.! In!
Psychology' and' Deterrence! (1989),! they! explore! the! psychological! aspects! of!deterrence! theory! by! examining! the! relationship! between! decision\makers’!emotions,!perceptions!and!motivations!as!well!as!domestic!political!needs.!!This!analysis,!with!contributions!from!Patrick!Morgan!and!Jack!Snyder,! is!critical!of!the!reliance!by!early!deterrence!theorists!on!surface!assessment!of!each!actor’s! cost\benefit! calculations.56! Instead,! they! argue! that! an! aggressor’s!perceptions! play! a! key! role! in! the! emergence! of! an! immediate! deterrence!situation.57!!!In! Between' Peace' and' War:' The' Nature' of' International' Crisis! (1984),!Richard! N.! Lebow! explores! the! requirements! of! deterrence! through! an!examination! of! why! adversaries! challenge! deterrence! policies.! He! examines!deterrence!by! focusing!on! the!perspective! and!decision\making!processes!of! the!aggressor! rather! than! the! deterrer.58! He! applies! this! framework! to! crises! of! the!twentieth! century,! including! the! 1948\49! Berlin! Crisis! and! the! Cuban! Missile!Crisis.! Although! his! work! offers! valuable! conclusions! about! the! source! and!dynamics! of! international! crises,! including! useful! criteria! for! deterrence,! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!54!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.53.!55!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,'p.99.!56!!Robert!Jervis,!Richard!Lebow,!and!Janice!Stein,!Psychology'and'Deterrence,!pp.!vii\x.!57!ibid,!p.1\3.!58!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!pp.ix\xi.!
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March!1961,!stating!its!purpose!was!to!‘deter!all!wars,!general!or!limited,!nuclear!or! conventional,! large! or! small’.64! Flexible' Response! was! formulated! with! the!intention!of!meeting! this!challenge!and!as!an!answer! for! the!apparent! failings!of!the! Eisenhower! administration’s! Massive' Retaliation! doctrine.65! In! Kennedy’s!










came!to!be!termed!as!Flexible'Response.73!It!was!a!doctrine!that!raised!the!nuclear!threshold! through! preparedness! and! willingness! to! mount! a! substantial!conventional! defence! and! use! nuclear!weapons! as! a!way! to! control! escalation.74!Kennedy! sought!ways! in!which! to! convey! to!Khrushchev! that!his! administration!would!be!no!less!resolute!than!the!former!administration!regarding!the!American!commitment! to! remain! in! and! protect! the! freedom! of! West! Berlin,! whilst!simultaneously!seeking!a!modus'vivendi!with!them!as!a!long\term!goal.75!!! The!Vienna!Conference!on!4! June!1961!was!an!opportunity! for!President!Kennedy! to! lay! the! foundations! of! a! new! era! of! calm! in! U.S./U.S.S.R.! relations.!However,!Khrushchev!approached!the!summit!with!brutal!confidence,!intending!to!intimidate! the! new! president! into! unilateral! concessions! on! the! U.S.! position! in!Berlin.76!Having!taken!office!just!four!months!prior,!and!in!the!wake!of!the!Bay!of!Pigs!embarrassment,!Kennedy!came!to! the!conference! in!a!position!of!weakness.!While! Khrushchev,! whose! nation! had! just! sent! the! first! person! into! space,! felt!convinced! of! his! ability! to! intimidate! his! apparently! inferior! opponent! and!intended!to!capitalise!on!this!confidence.77!For!Khrushchev,!the!conference!would!herald! the! resumption! of! his! ambition! to! integrate!West!Berlin! into! the!German!Democratic! Republic.! Khrushchev! wore! Kennedy! down! with! a! tirade! of! U.S.!failures! and! continuous!provocative!outbursts.78!After! the! summit! the!embattled!President!was!handed!Khrushchev’s!aide\memoire,!outlining!an!ultimatum!on!the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!73!Although!Eisenhower!was!content!that!the!risk!of!nuclear!reprisals!was!sufficient!enough!to!deter!Khrushchev!from!any!confrontational!moves!in!Berlin,!Kennedy!was!not!convinced!that!the!threat!of!preemptive!use!of!nuclear!deterrence!was!sufficiently!credible!or!wise.!See!James!Richardson,!Crisis'
Diplomacy,!p.210.!74!ibid.!75!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,'Deterrence,!p.414.!76!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev:'Man'and'His'Era,!New!York,!W.!W.!Norton,!2003,!p.495.!77!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August:'The'Berlin'Wall,!New!York,!M.!Evans!and!Company!Inc,!1978,!p.18.!78!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy:'An'Interpretive'Biography,'Chicago,!Ivan!R.!Dee,!2009,!p.129.!
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the! U.S.! deterrence! posture.86! It! can! be! considered! as! a! successful! deterrence!policy!as!it!fulfilled!the!three!main!criteria!for!projecting!a!credible!deterrence!and!as!a!result!maintained!the!status!quo!of!the!U.S.!commitment!to!Berlin.!!!





Perception'and'Deterrence'The! more! attention! the! 1961! Berlin! Crisis! receives! from! historians! and!political!scientists! the!more!the!role!of!perception!has!become!paramount! to! the!study.!When! practicing! deterrence,! perception! is! inextricably! linked,!where! it! is!considered! a! fundamental! driver! of! foreign! policy.1! It! is! the! balance! of! the!psychological! relationship! between! the! deterrer! and! the! challenger,! where!perception! surpasses! reality! in! the! decision\making! process.2! A! guide! to! the!cognitive! processes! of! the! challenger! is! a! vital! asset! to! policy\makers! when!operating!an!effective!deterrence!policy.3!Foreign!policy!decision\makers!require!a!clear!understanding!of!how!a!specific!opponent!perceives!their!commitments!and!how!this!opponent!makes!political! judgments,! in!order! to! tailor! their!deterrence!stance! appropriately.4! However,! as! these! cognitive!maps! are! often! unreliable! or!not! always! available,! the! deterrer! compensates! by! focusing! on! their! own! state’s!reputation! in! relation! to! their! commitments,! particularly! when! nuclear!annihilation! is! at! stake.5! As! a! result,! to! fill! the! uncertainty! of! the! opponent’s!objective,! ‘one! will! reinforce,! by! whatever! means! necessary,! a! reputation! that!seeks!to!minimize!misjudgment’.6!!President! Kennedy! relied! on! his! understanding! of! Khrushchev’s! political!cognitive!processes!whilst!also!bolstering!his!own!political!reputation!in!order!to!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Robert!McCalla,!Uncertain'Perceptions,!p.1.!2!Terrence!Roehrig,!From'Deterrence'to'Engagement,!p.15.!3!Patrick!Morgan,!“Saving!Face!For!the!Sake!of!Deterrence”,!p.133.!4!ibid.!5!ibid.!6!ibid,!pp.133\134.!
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!! Credibility! as! a! leader! is! based! on! perception! rather! than! reality.!Perception! theorist,! Robert! McCalla! explains! this! phenomenon! in! international!crises!in!the!following!way:!!In! trying! to!explain!why!a!person! takes!an!umbrella! in! the!morning,! it! is!irrelevant!to!the!explanation!of!this!behaviour!whether!or!not!it!rains!that!day! or! even! if! there! was! any! objective! (true)! likelihood! of! rain.! All! that!matters!for!the!explanation!is!that!the!person!thought!there!was!a!chance!of!rain.20!!!Consequently,! just! the! perception! of!weakness! in! the! face! of! an! external!threat! can! seriously! diminish! the! authority! and! credibility! of! a! leader.21!Brinkmanship,!originally!popularized!by!John!Foster!Dulles,!has!become!linked!to!a!policy!of!manipulating!the!shared!risks!of!war!in!order!to!prove!an!adversary’s!relative!lack!of!resolve,!or!even!significance.22!A!‘brinkmanship’!crisis!occurs!when!a!state!intentionally!challenges!a!central!commitment!of!an!adversary!in!the!hope!of!compelling!the!adversary!to!back!away!from!its!obligation.23!For!brinkmanship!to!occur,!the!aggressor!must!perceive!that!a!vulnerable!commitment!exists!and!it!is! caused,! in!part,!by! the! failure!of! the!challenged!nation! to!make!a! commitment!sufficiently! credible.24! As! a! result,! deterrence! and! brinkmanship! policies! are!intertwined! through! this! relationship,!when! the! failure! of! one!may! result! in! the!emergence!of!the!other.!!Therefore,! deterrence! consists! of! manipulating! the! opposing! state’s!assessment!of!interests!and!seeks!to!prevent!a!specified!behaviour!by!convincing!the!potential! aggressor! that! the! costs! involved!outweigh!any!benefits! that!might!come!from!embarking!upon!a!policy!of!brinkmanship.25!!The!1961!Berlin!Crisis!is!a!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!Robert!McCalla,!Uncertain'Perceptions,!p.16.!21!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.60.!22!ibid,!p.57.!23!ibid.!24!Richard!Lebow,!“The!Deterrence!Deadlock”,!in!Psychology'and'Deterrence,!ed.!Robert!Jervis,!Richard!Lebow,!and!Janice!Stein,!London,!The!Johns!Hopkins!University!Press,!1985,!pp.180\202,!p.182.!25!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.83.!
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good! example! of! this! intertwined! relationship,! as! the! deterrent! structure! of!American’s! Berlin! commitment! failed! to! be! perceived! as! sufficiently! credible! by!the!U.S.S.R.26!Khrushchev!was!thus!encouraged!by!this!perception!to!embark!on!a!policy!of!brinkmanship!to!gain!Soviet!concessions.27!!!!




economic!troubles!on!Stalin’s!excesses!and!the!military!contest!with!the!West!and!thus! looked! for!a! resolution!on!Berlin! that!would!mollify! the!West!and!allow! for!domestic!economic!concentration.33!However! this!grand!settlement!had! to!be!on!his!terms!in!order!to!stabilize!and!secure!his!position!as!leader!of!the!Soviet!Union.!It! was! clear! that! this! grand! settlement! Khrushchev! envisioned! was! beyond! his!grasps.! The! nature! of! the! Cold!War! conflict! and! the! fact! that! Khrushchev! never!appreciated! the! fear! of! appeasement! Americans! held,! derived! from! the! Munich!disaster,! would! not! see! significant! gains! to! demilitarization! until! the! Gorbachev!era.!However,!according!to!Aleksandr!Fursenko!and!Timothy!Naftali,!“what!varied!was! his! strategy! for! attaining! this! settlement.”! Where,! “Khrushchev! alternated!between! trying! to! seduce! the!West! and! scheming! to! scare! it”.34! However,! after!failing!to!intimidate!Eisenhower,!Khrushchev!postponed!his!challenge!on!Berlin’s!post!World!War!Two!status!quo!until!the!arrival!of!a!new!U.S.!administration.!!Evidence!of!Khrushchev’s!paranoia!about!retaining!absolute!power!can!be!seen! in! his! tendency! to! make! foreign! affair! decisions! independently! of! the!Presidium.35! Thirty\five! years! after! the! overthrow! attempt! by! Malenkov! and!Molotov,!the!1962!Moscow!party!boss!Nikolai!Yegorychev!stated:!You! have! to! understand! that! the! Presidium! hadn’t! changed! much! from!Stalin’s!time.!Anyone!who!dared!come!out!against!Khrushchev!would!have!to! leave!the!Presidium,!everyone!understood!this!perfectly.!Could!anyone!say!directly!to!Khrushchev,!‘You’re!wrong’?!No!one!would!have!dared.36!!!Yegorychev! further! stated! that,! ‘he! [Khrushchev]! overestimated! himself,!developed!an!inflated!sense!of!himself!as!if!he!knew!it!all,!considered!his!opinion!beyond!any!reproach’.37!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33!Aleksandr!Furensko!and!Timothy!Naftali,!Khrushchev’s'Cold'War,'p.540.!34!ibid,'p.541.!35!!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.364.!36!William!Taubman!interview!with!Nikolai!Yegorychev,!June!2000,!as!seen!in!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.364.!37!Furthermore,!Anastas!Mikoyan,!Soviet!statesmen!under!Khrushchev,!asserts!‘after!1957!Khrushchev!believed!he!did!not!have!to!reckon!with!anyone,!that!everyone!would!just!agree!with!him’!Nikolai!Yegorychev,!“Napravlen!Poslom,”!
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Georgy! Kornienk,! a! Soviet! diplomat! from! the! time,! asserts! that! the!Khrushchev! era! can! be! divided! into! two:! before! and! after! 1958.! After! 1958!Khrushchev! stopped! consulting! and! surrounded! himself! with! ‘yes\men’.38!According!to!William!Taubman,!as!Khrushchev!sat!alone!at!the!top,!his!supremacy!became!his!biggest!blunder.39!No! longer!constrained!by!any!effective!opposition,!he!was! free! to!act!on! issues!of!which!he!knew!very! little,! to!consult!or!not!as!he!pleased!and!to!introduce!significant!policy!on!impulse.40!As!a!result,!Khrushchev’s!foreign! policy!was! a! reflection! of! his! temperament:! that! is,! assertive,! ambitious,!confident! and,! at! times,! reckless.41! This! led! to! policies! characterized!by! coercive!diplomacy,! brinkmanship! and! ignoring! the! advice! of! colleagues! who! advised!caution.42! Khrushchev’s! political! persona! was! undoubtedly! a! major! factor! in!decision!making!during!this!period,!given!the!concentrated!nature!of!power!within!the! U.S.S.R.43! The! Soviet! Union’s! foreign! strategies! were! at! the! mercy! of!Khrushchev’s! perception! and! inclination! towards! brinkmanship,! making! an!examination!of!his!motivation!a!key!factor!when!assessing!Kennedy’s!decision!to!reinvigorate!U.S.!deterrence!policy.!!Khrushchev! focused! much! of! his! attention! on! the! character! of! Western!leaders.44! For! example,! he! believed! Winston! Churchill! was! ‘an! arsonist! and! a!militarist’,! Harry!Truman!was! an! ‘aggressive!man! and! a! fool’! and!Dean!Acheson!was! ‘a! political! half\wit’.45! Khrushchev’s! individual! perception! of! adversaries! in!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!interview!by!Leonid!Pleshakov,!Ogonek,!No.6,!1989,!p.7!as!seen!in!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.365,!740.!!38!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.365.!39!ibid,!p.366.!40!ibid.!41!Paul!Marantz,!“Internal!Politics!and!Soviet!Foreign!Policy”,!p.142.!42!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.366.!43!Paul!Marantz,!“Internal!Politics!and!Soviet!Foreign!Policy”,!p.142.!44!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.331.!45!Although!Marxism\Leninism!dictated!that!economic!imperatives!should!drive!policy,!Khrushchev!concentrated!instead!on!his!perception!of!Western!leader’s!characteristics.!He!was!often!crude!and!belligerent!in!the!way!he!attempted!to!
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the!international!sphere!was!pivotal!to!how!he!formulated!foreign!strategies!and!decisions,! particularly! towards! the!U.S.46!As! a! result,!Khrushchev’s!perception!of!Kennedy’s!resolve!as!a!weak!enforcer!of!U.S.!deterrence!on!the!Berlin!commitment!was!critical!in!his!brinkmanship!strategy!over!Berlin!in!1961.!Khrushchev! had! a! number! of! reasons! to! perceive! the! West! had! a!weakening!commitment!to!Berlin.!Of!the!many!contributing!factors!that!influenced!Khrushchev’s! perception! of! the! West,! the! two! that! appear! to! have! been! most!influential!were!the!loss!of!the!nuclear!‘hardliner’!John!Foster!Dulles,!Eisenhower’s!Secretary! of! State,! and! the! perceived! character! of! the! new!U.S.! administration.47!Khrushchev!believed!that!President!Eisenhower!was! ‘much!too!dependent!on!his!advisors’,!particularly!Dulles,!described!by!Khrushchev!as!Eisenhower’s!shadow.48!Khrushchev! considered! Dulles! to! be! the! architect! of! Eisenhower’s! Massive'
Retaliation! policies.! Indeed,!during! the!Geneva! summit!of! July!1955,!Khrushchev!said!Eisenhower!was!‘like!a!dutiful!schoolboy!taking!his!lead!from!his!teacher…!it!certainly!appeared! that!Eisenhower!was! letting!Dulles!do!his! thinking! for!him’.49!Thus,! while! Eisenhower! seemed! weak,! Khrushchev! perceived! Dulles! as! his!staunchest! opponent.! Khrushchev! summarized! his! feelings! during! the! 1958\59!Berlin!Crisis!by!saying,!!Eisenhower!was! very!much! under! the! influence! of! Dulles,! an! aggressive!man! who! had! a! physical! revulsion! against! the! Soviet! Union! and! an!ideological! hatred! for! everything!new,! everything! communist,! everything!socialist.50!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!capitalize!on!perceived!short!falls.!Nikita!S.!Khrushchev,!Khrushchev'Remembers,!pp.355\356;!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.331.!46!Paul!Marantz,!“Internal!Politics!and!Soviet!Foreign!Policy”,!p.142;!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.331.!47!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.419.!48!Nikita!S.!Khrushchev,!Khrushchev'Remembers,'p.102.!49!William!J!Tompson,!Khrushchev:'A'Political'Life,'New!York,!Macmillan,!1995,!p.149;!Nikita!S.!Khrushchev,!Khrushchev'Remembers,'p.363,!397,!399.!50!Nikita!S.!Khrushchev,!Khrushchev'Remembers,'p.362.!
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Dulles’! death! from! cancer! in! 1959!was! a!massive! blow! to! the! credibility! of! the!




The!1961!U.S.!Presidential!election!offered!Khrushchev!the!possibility!of!a!new,! more! open\minded! administration! and! a! malleable! young! President! who!could!be!pressured!into!a!Soviet\friendly!resolution!on!Berlin.59!This!perception!of!ambiguity! and! weakness! encouraged! Khrushchev’s! brinkmanship! and! the! new!President!Kennedy!did!little!to!dissuade!this!perception!by!allowing!his!deterrence!approach! to! falter! during! the! Bay! of! Pigs! incident.60! For! Khrushchev,! the! U.S.!nuclear! deterrent! under! Kennedy’s! leadership! did! not! appear! credible.61!Historians! Richard! Lebow! and! Janice! Stein! assert! that! U.S.! missile! capabilities!mattered!little!to!Khrushchev!as! long!as!he!doubted!Kennedy’s!resolve!to!defend!his!Berlin!commitment!when!it!came!to!the!ultimate!cost.62!Kennedy’s!youth!and!swift!rise!to!power!suggested!to!Khrushchev!that!he!might!be!a!simpler!opponent!to!manipulate! than! those! that! he! had! previously! challenged! and! he! intended! to!capitalize! on! this.63! The! fact! that! Kennedy!was! the! son! of! a!millionaire! had! not!gone! unnoticed! by! the! Soviet! leader.! Khrushchev! had! remarked! upon! this!more!than! once! and! as! a! believer! of!Marxism\Leninism,! this! fact! did! not! sit!well!with!him.! As! an! older!man! from! a! humble! background,! Khrushchev! assumed! that! he!would! be!more! than! a!match! for! a! rich! young! boy,! who! had! ‘known! nothing! of!struggle!and!sacrifice’.64!Moreover,!he!wanted!to!meet!and!influence!the!President!before!his!policies!were!firmly!in!place.65!!A!K.G.B.!report!from!31!May!31!1961!stated!that!Kennedy!was!‘unlikely!to!possess! the! qualities! of! an! outstanding! person’,! which! further! contributed! to!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!59!Vladislav!Zubok,!Inside'The'Kremlins'Cold'War,'pp.237\238.!60!The!Bay!of!Pigs!invasion!took!place!on!17!to!19!April!1961.!It!was!a!failed!invasion!by!Central!Intelligence!Agency!operatives!to!aid!a!counter\revolutionary!military!attempt!to!depose!Fidel!Castro.!The!invasion!was!humiliatingly!defeated!within!three!days,!with!Kennedy!turning!down!the!option!to!send!in!reinforcements.!!Vladislav!Zubok,!A'Failed'Empire,!p.140.!!61!ibid.!62!Richard!Lebow!and!Janice!Stein,!“Deterrence!and!The!Cold!War.’!Political'Science'
Quarterly,!Vol.110,!No.2,!1995:157\181,!pp.157\180.!63!!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.45.!64!Nikita!S.!Khrushchev,!Khrushchev'Remembers,'p.488.!65!!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.45.!
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Khrushchev’s!perception!of!an!inferior!opponent!between!the!two!superpowers!in!their! battle! of! wills.66! As! a! result,! Khrushchev! embarked! upon! a! policy! of!brinkmanship! believing! pressure,! not! war,! would! see! the! young! President!abandon! his! commitment! to! Berlin.! He!was! confident! that,! when! it! came! to! the!brink,! Kennedy! would! not,! ‘fight! over! West! Berlin,! which! it! needed! like! a! dog!needs! five! legs’.67! Khrushchev’s! confidence! in! his! policies! towards! Kennedy! and!the!U.S.! grew!after! the! first! successful! space! flight! of! Yuri!Gagarin! in!April! 1961!and!Kennedy’s!reputation!was!damaged!after!the!Bay!of!Pigs! incident.!Kennedy’s!reluctance!to!follow!through!in!the!Bay!of!Pigs!operation!suggested!to!Khrushchev!that!Kennedy!had!a!tendency!towards!hesitation!in!a!crisis.68!!Lyndon!Johnson!suggested!that!Khrushchev!‘has!tasted!blood!in!Cuba!and!Laos! and! now! Berlin,! and! he’s! out! for! more.! He! thinks! he! can! push! a! young!President!around!and!a!new!administration!and!is!probing!to!see!how!far!he!can!go’.69!Arnold!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush!go!so!far!as!to!argue!that!Khrushchev!might!have!not!renewed!the!offensive!on!Berlin!if!it!had!not!been!for!the!U.S.!debacle!at!the!Bay!of!Pigs.70!Furthermore,!Robert!Kennedy,! in!an!interview!for!the!Kennedy!Library,!said:!The! Russians! thought! they! could! kick! [the! President]! around! [and! that]!Khrushchev! got! the! idea…that! he!was! dealing!with! a! rather!weak! figure!because! [J.F.K.]! didn’t! do!what! Khrushchev!would! have! done! in! Cuba,! in!not!going!and! taking!Cuba…that!he!was!dealing!with!a!young! figure!who!perhaps!had!no!confidence.!It!was!a!shock!to![Jack]!that!somebody!would!be!so!harsh!and!definitive!as!this.71!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66!Aleksandr!Furensko!and!Timothy!Naftali,!Khrushchev’s'Cold'War,'p.340.!67!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.539.!68!Stephen!Cimbala,!Coercive'Military'Strategy,!Texas,!A&M!University!Press,!1998,!p.52.!69!Donald!Kagan,!“Weak!Will,!High!Wall”,!Dicta&Contradicta,!2013.!!!70!!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,!p.123.!71!Seymour!Hersh,!The'Dark'Side'of'Camelot,!Toronto,!Little!Brown!&!Company,!1997,!p.252.!!
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Khrushchev! took! advantage! of! Kennedy’s! perceived! failures! to! predict!Kennedy’s!future!actions!if!the!U.S.S.R.!was!to!challenge!Berlin.72! !To!Khrushchev,!the!Bay!of!Pigs!failure!proved!that!the!United!States!strategic!deterrence!approach!was!no!longer!in!firm!or!even!capable!hands.73!He!was!quoted!as!saying,!‘I!would!say!the!chance!is!more!than!ninety!five!percent!there!would!not!be!a!war’.74!This!gave! Khrushchev! the! confidence,! precedent,! and! the! perception! that! Kennedy!would!bend!under!pressure.75!Khrushchev!was!confident!that!Kennedy!would!not!risk!war!and!therefore!he!would!‘help!him!solve!the!problem,!give!him!a!choice!to!go!to!war!or!sign!a!peace!treaty’.76!!To!Khrushchev!this!all!added!up!to!a!perception!that!the!young!President!would!go!to!great! lengths!to!avoid!conflict,!especially! if!Khrushchev!seemed!hell\bent! on! one.77! At! a! Presidium! meeting! ten! days! prior! to! the! Vienna! Summit,!Chairman! Khrushchev! declared! his! intention! to! pressure! the! U.S.! President! on!Berlin.78!In!response!to!Mikoyan’s!caution,!Khrushchev!insisted!excitedly!that!the!weakness!Kennedy!had!so!overwhelmingly!demonstrated!at!the!Bay!of!Pigs!must!be!exploited.79!When!he!returned!to!the!Soviet!Embassy!in!Vienna,!his!first!session!with! President! Kennedy! only! confirmed! and! heightened! his! confidence.! In!commenting!on!his!meeting!with!Kennedy!he!reported!to!Troyanovsk,!‘what!can!I!tell! you;! this! man! is! very! inexperienced,! even! immature.! Compared! to! him,!Eisenhower!was!a!man!of!intelligence!and!vision’.80!Khrushchev’s!miscalculation!at!Vienna!was!to!drive!Soviet!policy!from!that!point!on.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!72!Vladislav!Zubok,!A'Failed'Empire,!p.140.!73!ibid.!74!ibid.!75!Petr!Lunák,!“Khrushchev!and!the!Berlin!Crisis”,!p.72.!76!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.539!77!ibid,!p.495.!78!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.539!79!ibid.!80!Troianovskii,!Cherez'gody,!p.44!as!seen!in!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!pp.495\496,!766.!!!
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defence!polices!then!they!are!in!domestic!politics.88!Scholars,!such!as!Robert!Dahl!and!Richard!Fenno,! support! this! idea,! arguing! that! the! autonomy!of! presidential!decision\making! is! more! enhanced! in! foreign! policy! than! it! is! in! domestic!matters.89!Dahl!insists!that!the!President,!‘has!long!enjoyed!substantial!discretion’!in!foreign!policy!and,!according!to!Fenno,!the!Foreign!Affairs!Committee!members!‘help!make!policy!in!an!environment!dominated!by!the!President’.90!Consequently,!during! the! 1961! Berlin! Crisis,! Kennedy! had! a! relative! amount! of! autonomy! in!directing!decision\making.91!Therefore,! a! focus!on!his! perceptions! and! actions! is!justified!when!examining!the!U.S.!foreign!policy!decisions!during!this!crisis.!!Deterrence! theory! suggests! that! as! a! commitment! gains! credibility,! a!challenger!revises!and!updates!their!original!perception!of!a!deterrer’s!resolve.92!As!such,!a!challenger!will!be!forced!to!reassess!the!likelihood!of!success!based!on!the!new!information!obtained!during!the!duration!of!a!crisis.93!!In! June! 1961,! President! Kennedy! met! with! Premier! Khrushchev! at! the!Vienna!Summit,!where!he!aimed!to!reverse!the!damage!and!humiliation!to!his!own!and! his! country’s! international! repute! caused! by! the! Bay! of! Pigs! incident.94! He!eagerly!sought! to!convince! the!Soviet! leader!of! the!unwavering!U.S.!commitment!to!the!people!of!West!Berlin.!However,!his!humiliation!at!the!hands!of!Fidel!Castro!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!88!Brandice!Canes\Wrone,!William!G.!Howell,!David!E.!Lewis.!“Toward!a!Broader!Understanding!of!Presidential!Power:!A!Revaluation!of!the!Two!Presidencies!Thesis”,!The'Journal'of'Politics,!Vol.!70,!No.1,!2008,!pp.1\16.!89!Richard!Fenno,!Congressmen'in'Committees,!Boston,!Little,!Brown!and!Co,!1973,!p.212.!90!Robert!Dahl,!Limited'Nuclear'Options,'Washington,!International!Institute!for!Strategic!Studies,!1975,!p.58;!Richard!Fenno,!Congressmen'in'Committee,'p.212.'!91!Ole!R.!Holsti,!“Foreign!Policy!Decision!Makers!Viewed!Psychologically”,!pp.125\126.!92!In!other!words,!an!immediate!deterrence!crises,!arising!from!the!failure!or!appearance!of!a!failing!general!deterrence!policy,!establishes!credibility,!Elli!Lieberman,!Deterrence'Theory:'Success'or'Failure'in'ArabWIsraeli'Wars,'Washington,!Diane!Publishing,!1995,!p.31;!Elli!Lieberman,!Reconceptualizing'Deterrence,'p.23.!93!Elli!Lieberman,!Reconceptualizing'Deterrence,'p.23.!94!Curtis!Cate,!The'Ides'of'August,'p.18.!
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gave! Khrushchev! an! important! edge! in! the! power! play! between! the! two!men.95!According!to!William!Taubman,!Kennedy!missed!an!opportunity!during!the!Vienna!Summit! to! ‘ignore! the! ideology,! dismiss! the! bluster,! propose! a! straight! forward!discussion! of! outstanding! German! issues,! and,! if! Khrushchev! refused,! bid! him! a!cool! farewell!with! an! invitation! for!practical! negotiations!when!Khrushchev!was!ready!for!them’.96!Instead,!President!Kennedy!allowed!himself!to!be!drawn!into!a!conceptual,! ideological! debate! on! Marxist! theory! and! the! role! of! historical!inevitability.97!The!President’s!apparently!superficial!grasp!on!Marxism!played!to!Khrushchev’s!advantage,! and!he! tirelessly!bombarded!Kennedy!with! suggestions!and!threats!about!U.S.!foreign!policy!in!Europe.98!Khrushchev’s!interpreter,!Viktor!Sukhodrev,! later!remarked!that! the!Soviet! leader!came!away! from!Vienna!with!a!meager!impressifon!of!Kennedy,!a!sense!that!‘the!guy!was!inexperienced,!perhaps!not!up!to!the!task!of!properly!running!a!country!such!as!the!United!States’.99!!After! the!Vienna!Summit!had!concluded,!Khrushchev!handed!Kennedy!an!aide\memoire.!The!document!contained!a!challenge!to!the!U.S.!position! in!Berlin,!“The!U.S.S.R.!will!sign!a!peace!treaty!unilaterally!and!all!rights!of!access!to!Berlin!will!expire”.100!Although!the!document!did!not!overtly!contain!any!reference!to!the!end!of!the!U.S.!commitment!to!the!city,!it!was!clear!that!this!would!be!the!price!of!any! peace! treaty.101! Several! days! later,! on! 9! June! 1961,! the! aide\memoire! was!published!in!full!by!an!official!Soviet!news!agency,!TASS.102!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!95!Curtis!Cate,!The'Ides'of'August,'p.18.!96!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.496.!97!Kennedy!gave!off!an!impression!of!naivety!and!inexperience!on!a!global!scale!by!allowing!himself!to!be!drawn!into!an!ideological!debate!in!which!he!had!little!expertise.!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!p.128.!!98!ibid.!!99!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!p.129.!100!“Aide\Memoire,!Soviet!Union!to!the!United!States,!Handed!by!Premier!Khrushchev!to!President!Kennedy!at!Vienna,!4!Jun!1961”.!Documents!on!Germany,!1944–1985.!United!States!Department!of!State,!Office!of!the!Historian,!Bureau!of!Public!Affairs,!1985,!pp.729\733.!!101!ibid.!102!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,!pp.123\124.!
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Moreover,!in!a!televised!speech!after!the!publication,!Khrushchev!declared!a! deadline! for! the! acceptance! of! his! proposal,! ‘a! peaceful! settlement! in! Europe!must!be!attained!this!year’.103!If!breached,!Khrushchev!insisted,!he!would!hand!the!settlement!of!Berlin!over!to!Walter!Ulbricht,!who!was!determined!to!see!the!end!of!U.S.! occupation! rights! in! Berlin.! Consequently,! the! aide\memoire! deadline! crisis!represented!a!real!challenge!to!the!U.S.!commitment!to!maintaining!the!status!quo!in!Berlin.104!The!Soviet!approach!had!minimal!risk!given!that!the!activating!part!of!the!threat,!the!deadline,!was!fairly!ambiguous!and!could!be!reinterpreted,!adapted,!or!withdrawn!at!any!time.105!This!allowed!Khrushchev!to!pressure!Kennedy!with!the! option! to! bow! out,! if! his! original! assessment! of! Kennedy’s! temperament!proved!to!be!wrong.!!Kennedy!told!Khrushchev!on!3!June!1961!during!the!Vienna!Summit!that!he! wanted! to! avoid! any! miscalculation! by! either! country,! replacing! it! with!precision! in! judgments.106! To! Khrushchev! this! seemed! like! an! admission! of!Kennedy’s!reluctance!to!enforce!U.S.!nuclear!deterrence.107!!In! addition,!Khrushchev’s! aide,! Fedor!Burlatsky,!believed! that!Kennedy’s!flexibility! and! lack! of! apparent! ideological! conviction!might! have! contributed! to!Khrushchev’s! perception! that! Kennedy! lacked! backbone! when! it! came! to!defending!and!enforcing!U.S.!foreign!commitments.108!!If!President!Kennedy!took!anything!away!from!the!Vienna!Summit,!it!was!that!United!States’!commitments!under!his!presidency!had,!in!Khrushchev’s!mind,!lost! all! credibility.! The! Cuban! invasion! disaster! just! months! before! had!consolidated! an! image! in!Khrushchev’s!mind! that! told! of! a!weak,! indecisive! and!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!103!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,!pp.123\124.!104!ibid.!105!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.418.!106!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States.!1961\1963.!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union,!Doc.!85.!“Memorandum!of!Conversation,!Vienna,!June!3,!1961”,!U.S.'Department'of'State,'
Office'of'the'Historian,!1961.'!107!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,'p.124.!108!William!Tompson,!Khrushchev,!p.235.!
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unprepared!President,!which!was!precisely!what!he!had!been!hoping!for.!Kennedy!when! talking! to! John! Reston! about! Khrushchev’s! bluster! immediately! after! last!session!at!the!Vienna!Conference!in!1961!confirmed!this!belief!saying,!!I!think!he!did!it!because!of!the!Bay!of!Pigs…So!he!just!beat!the!hell!out!of!me…I’ve! got! a! terrible! problem.! If! he! (Khrushchev)! thinks! I’m!inexperienced!and!have!no!guts,!until!we!remove!those!ideas!we!won’t!get!anywhere!with!him.!So!we!have!to!act.109!!!For! weeks! after! the! Vienna! confrontation,! Khrushchev’s! attitude!preoccupied!the!President!as!he!took!personal!charge!of!planning!the!discussion!to!meet! the! Berlin! challenge.110! Kennedy! tasked! Dean! Acheson! with! preparing! a!proposal!to!deal!with!the!crisis.111!Acheson!was!a!wise!choice!given!his!experience!handling! the! Berlin! crisis! in! 1958.! Acheson! argued! that! the! Soviet! leader! was!testing! American! resolve.112! Berlin! was,! ‘not! a! problem,! but! a! pretext’.113!Khrushchev! was! seeking! to! ‘discredit! the! United! States! or! at! least! seriously!damage! its! prestige! in! order! to! facilitate! a! Soviet! expansion! across! Europe’.114!Acheson! insisted! that! the! only! solution! would! be! a! strong,! unwavering!demonstration!of!Kennedy’s!resolve.115!!In!the!context!of!a!crisis,!Robert!McCalla!asserts!that,!‘decision!makers!are!more! likely! to! be! cognizant! of! the! fact! that! what! they! are! doing! will! be! an!important! factor! in! their! opponent’s! thinking’.116! This!was! certainly! true! for! the!Kennedy! administration.! According! to! Robert! Kennedy’s! memoirs,! the! Kennedy!administration!assessed!how!Khrushchev!would!perceive! their!actions!and!what!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!109!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!p.128.!110!ibid,!pp.129\130.!111!ibid.!112!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!pp.129\130.!113!ibid.!114!ibid.!115!ibid.!116!Robert!McCalla,!Uncertain'Perceptions,!pp.24\25.!
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affect!this!might!have!on!his!perception!of!their!resolve.117!Evidence!of!Kennedy’s!effort! to! identify! Khrushchev’s! perception! of! his! presidential! style! is! clear! in! a!
Deadline' interview! of! 4! June! 1961.118! Kennedy! reported! to! New' York' Times!columnist!James!Reston!that,!after!Vienna,!!I!felt!sure!Khrushchev!thought!that!anybody!who!had!made!such!a!mess!of!the! Cuban! invasion! had! no! judgment,! and! any! President! who! had!made!such! a! blunder,! but! then! didn’t! see! it! through! had! no! guts…I! tried! to!convince! Khrushchev! of! U.S.! determination,! but! had! failed.! It! was! now!essential!to!demonstrate!our!firmness.119!!!Further!evidence!of!Kennedy’s!thoughts!regarding!Khrushchev’s!opinion!of!his! Presidency! were! clear! when! he! spoke! with! Llewellyn! Thompson,! a! U.S.!diplomat,! about! Khrushchev’s! actions! in! August! 1962.120! ! The! President! was!reported!to!have!asked,!! ‘do!you!think!that!Cuba!and!the!fact!we!hadn’t!gone!into!Laos!might! have! given! him! (Khrushchev)! the! impression! that!we!were! going! to!give!away!Berlin?’.121!!Kennedy! greatly! feared! Soviet! miscalculation! concerning! the! West’s!position!on!Berlin.122!The!President!believed!that!the!crisis!emerged!from!a!fit!of!Soviet! opportunism! and! his! failing! to! sufficiently! demonstrate! resolve! and!credibility! to!U.S.!commitments.123!Kennedy!knew!that! the!Bay!of!Pigs! fiasco!and!his! poor! performance! at! the! Vienna! Summit! had! cost! him! considerable! prestige!and! credibility.124! As! a! result,! Kennedy! was! extremely! wary! of! Khrushchev’s!challenge,!believing! that!Berlin!was!a! test!of! resolve! rather! than! the!weighing!of!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!117!The!best!example!here!is!the!Kennedy!administration.!Where!Kennedy!and!his!advisors!often!made!conscious!efforts!to!ask!how!their!actions!would!look!to!Nikita!Khrushchev,!Robert!F.!Kennedy,!Thirteen'Days,'New!York,!W.W.!Norton,!1969,!pp.102\106.!!118!Seymour!Hersh,!The'Dark'Side'of'Camelot,'Toronto,!Little!Brown!&!Company,!1997,!p.252;!James!Reston,!Deadline,!New!York,!Random!House,!1991,!pp.290\291.!119!ibid.!120!Aleksandr!Furensko!and!Timothy!Naftali,!Khrushchev’s'Cold'War,'p.543.!121!ibid.!122!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.426.!123!ibid.!124!ibid.!
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nuclear!capabilities.125!Reflecting!on!the!gravity!of! the!post\1945!Berlin!situation!Kennedy!said:!The! real! problem! is!more! the! subtle! struggle! for!Berlin,!where! they! [the!Soviets]!will!try!and!choke!us!off,!step!by!step.!That!is!going!to!be!the!real!struggle,! where! they! try! to! end! it! not! with! a! bang! but! with! a! whimper,!which!never!seems!quite!worth!a!war.!It!is!going!to!be!a!test!of!nerve!and!will.126!!!!Consequently,! Kennedy! became! increasingly! occupied! with! the! notion! that! the!crisis! was! a! result! of! a! failing! to! impart! a! perception! of! integrity! and!preparedness.127!!Therefore,! in! order! to! resolve! the! crisis,! the! Soviet! perception! had! to! be!realigned! along! firm! and! credible! grounds.! This! was! not! a! strategic! crisis! over!Berlin!itself,!but!one!of!Soviet!perceptions!of!American!resolve!For!Kennedy,!Soviet!expectation!and!perception!about!the!behavior!of!the!U.S.!and! its! reactions!was!one!of! the!most!valuable!assets!he!possessed! in!world!affairs.128!Furthermore,!he!believed!that!any!appearance!of!weakness!in!the!face!of!a!challenge!in!Berlin!1961!could!seriously!challenge!the!authority!of!the!President!as!a! foreign! leader.129!U.S.! foreign!prestige!was!under!threat!and!Kennedy!had!to!keep!the!American!long\standing!commitment!to!the!city!to!avoid!a!loss!of!further!prestige.130!!!Kennedy! worried! more! than! Eisenhower! about! the! possibility! of! a!miscalculation! in! the! missile! age.131! His! actions! suggest! that! he! was! very!concerned!about!the! impression!his!policies!had!on!foreign! leaders!\!particularly!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!125!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.426.!126!John!F.!Kennedy,!The'Strategy'of'Peace,!New!York,!Harper!&!Brother,!1960,!p.214.!127!!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!pp.129\130;!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,'p.426.!128!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,!p.125.!129!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.60.!130!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.89.!131!James!Richardson,!Crisis'Diplomacy,!p.210.!
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As! a! result,! the! focus! on! image! and! perception! became! central! to! the!management!of!deterrence!during!the!Kennedy!administration.142!!Believing!that!a!retreat! from! Berlin! might! unravel! the! whole! western! deterrence! structure,!Kennedy!insisted:!If!we!are!expelled!from!that!area,!and!if!we!accept!the!loss!of!our!rights,!no!one! would! have! any! confidence! in! U.S.! commitments! and! pledges.! US!national!security!is!involved!in!this!matter!because!if!we!were!to!accept!the!Soviet!proposal!U.S.! commitments!would!be! regarded!as! a!mere! scrap!of!paper.143!!!Moreover,! the! C.I.A.! handed! the! President! a! report,! sourced! from! information!given! by! defected! spy!Oleg! Penkovsky,! suggesting! that! the! Soviet! leader! did! not!believe!Kennedy!would!risk!war!over!Berlin.144!The!report!inferred!that!this!crisis!was!merely!an!attempt!to!jumpstart!negotiations!over!the!future!of!Berlin.145!Renowned!historian!Arthur!Schlesinger,!asserts!that!the!President,!Had!never!encountered!any!leader!with!whom!he!could!not!exchange!ideas!–!anyone!so!impervious!to!reasoned!argument!or!so!apparently!indifferent!to! the! prospective! obliteration! of!mankind…Berlin! held! the! threat,! if! not!the!certitude!of!war.146!!!!This!threat!of!war!was!not!only!meant!to!scare!Kennedy,!but!force!him!into!submission.147!However,!Khrushchev!underestimated!Kennedy’s!resolve!to!uphold!U.S.!prestige!in!the!face!of!extreme!confrontation.148!!More!importantly,!the!Soviet!leader! underestimated! Kennedy’s! deep! understanding! of! the! inner! working!psychology! of! foreign! relations.149! After! the! Vienna! Summit,! President! Kennedy!reported!his!impressions!of!the!Soviet!leader!to!Hugh!Sidey,!saying:!I! never! met! a! man! like! this.! [I]! talked! and! talked! about! how! a! nuclear!exchange! would! kill! seventy! million! people! in! ten! minutes! and! he! just!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!142!John!Gaddis,!Strategies'of'Containment,'p.212,!233.!!143!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,'p.127.!144!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.94.!145!ibid.!146!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!p.128.!147!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.495.!148!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.89.!149!ibid,'p.104.!
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writings.12! In! Strategy' of' Peace! (1960),! he! stated! in! reference! to! Berlin,! ‘making!clear! our! peaceful! but! determined! intentions! is! important’.13! Kennedy! showed! a!keen!understanding!of! the!significance!of!clear!communication!when!he!stated,! ‘I!think!it!is!important!also!that!Mr.!Khrushchev!recognize!what!he!is!up!against!–!so!that!he!does!not!miscalculate!our!determination!or!underestimate!our!resources’.14!Ironically!Khrushchev’s!bullying! tactics!had! the!opposite!effect! to! the!one!intended:!instead!of!Kennedy!wavering!over!Berlin,!it!led!to!the!U.S.!taking!a!more!absolute!stance!than!it!ever!had!previously!articulated.!The!Americans!now!made!it!clear!that!they!had!so!much!at!stake,!and!in!that!sense!raised!the!overall!stakes!of!the!contest!over!Berlin.!The!1961!Berlin!Crisis!‘raised!the!West’s!position!in!Berlin!to! extreme! visibility! and! saliency’.15! Khrushchev’s! brinkmanship! tactics! in! effect!illustrates!deterrence! theory,!as! it! forced! the!Kennedy!administration! to! raise! its!own!commitment,!raising!the!stakes!for!all!concerned.16!!!As!stated!previously,! for!deterrence!policies! to!be!effective,!commitments!must!be!made!explicit!and!overt,! in!order! to! lay! the! foundations! for!credibility.17!The! more! specific! the! commitment! appears! to! be,! the! more! likely! it! is! to! be!respected.18! Conversely,! very! broad! definitions! are! less! likely! to! be! perceived! as!indicators!of!resolve.!Thus!it!is!imperative!to!be!unambiguous!and!direct,!as!vague!commitments! are! likely! to! be! perceived! as! a! marker! of! indecisive! intentions.19!Kennedy! successfully! fulfilled! this! requirement! of! deterrence! theory! by! using! a!map!during!his!July!address!to!define!the!U.S.!commitment!to!Berlin!very!precisely.!During!the!speech,!the!President!said:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!John!F.!Kennedy,!Strategy'of'Peace,!p.10.!13!ibid.!14!ibid.!15!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.418.!16!ibid.!17!Yehoshafat!Harkabi,!Nuclear'War,!pp.9\25;!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.64;!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!pp.84\88.!18!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.85.!19!ibid,!pp.85\86.!
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This! map! makes! very! clear! the! problem! we! face.! The! white! is! West!Germany!–!the!East!is!the!area!controlled!by!the!Soviet!Union,!and!as!you!can!see!from!the!chart,!West!Berlin!is!110!miles!within!the!area!which!the!Soviets!now!dominate!–!which! is! immediately! controlled!by! the! so\called!East!German!regime.20!!!By!clearly!setting!out! the!extent!of!U.S.!responsibility,!Kennedy!gained!credibility!as! he! removed! miscommunication! from! the! equation.21! The! explicit! and! frank!nature!of!Kennedy’s!July!address!worked!to!raise!his!commitment!credibility.!The!emphasis!upon!the!American!commitment!was!unmistakable:!‘to!sum!it!all!up,!we!seek!peace!\!but!we!shall!not!surrender’.22!The!pressure!was!now!on!Khrushchev!not!to!challenge!him.!Michael! Beschloss! asserts! that! Kennedy,! unlike! Eisenhower,! ‘was! not!comfortable! with! ambiguity! when! the! stakes! were! as! high! as! they! were! over!Berlin.!He!was!always!afraid!of!nuclear!war!by!miscalculation’.23!!Kennedy!had!to!‘draw!a!line!in!the!sand’!in!order!to!avoid!Khrushchev!claiming!he!had!‘crossed!the!line’!accidently.24!In!the!July!Address,!the!President!‘laid!a!clearly!visible!tripwire,!one! that! could!not! simply!be! stumbled!on’.25!The!Daily'Herald'editorial! reported!Kennedy! ‘made! it! as! clear! as! words! and! precautionary! deeds! can! make! it! that!there!will!be!no!surrender! to!Russian! threats!or! to!Russian! forces!over!Berlin’.26!The! extensive!media! coverage!of! the! address!pushed! the!1961!Berlin!Crisis! into!the!global!spotlight.!!With!an!audience!of! fifty!million! in! the!U.S.!alone,! the!speech!received!an!overwhelmingly! positive! consensus! from! the!West.! The! President! Kennedy! was!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!21!James!Richardson,!Crisis'Diplomacy,!p.210.!22!He!went!on,!‘We!cannot!and!will!not!permit!the!Communists!to!drive!us!out!of!Berlin,!either!gradually!or!by!force’,!in!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!23!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'pp.279\280.!24!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,!p.99.!25!ibid.!26!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August,'p.114.!
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seen! to! be! taking! charge! of! the! crisis.27! Newspapers! in! the! U.S.! commended! the!President! for! being! firm!but! not! hostile! in! tone.! The!New'York'Times,! on!26! July!1961,! reported! that,! ‘at! once! solemn,! determined,! and! conciliatory! the! President!last!night!reasserted!American!leadership!of!the!free!world’.28!The!President’s!firm!manner! worked! to! regain! presidential! prestige! and! give! credibility! to! the! U.S.!Berlin! commitment.29! Kennedy! successfully! began! the! reinvigoration! of! his!deterrence!policy!and!he!did!it!on!the!international!stage.30!!One! particularly! noteworthy! element! of! the! July! Address!was! Kennedy’s!use!of!the!word!‘West’!with!the!word!‘Berlin’.31!No!U.S.!President!before!Kennedy!had!differentiated!so!explicitly!between!the!commitment!to!all!of!Berlin!and!West!Berlin.32!As!if!to!emphasize!the!importance!of!the!city!to!the!safety!of!the!European!continent!he!said:!!!West!Europe!is!vital!to!our!national!interests!and!we!have!supported!it!in!two!wars,!if!we!were!to!leave!West!Berlin,!Europe!would!be!abandoned!as!well,!so!when!we!are!talking!about!West!Berlin,!we!are!also!talking!about!West!Europe.33!!!Kennedy! used! the! phrase! ‘West! Berlin’! seventeen! times! in! the! half! hour!address.34! If! the! implications! of! this! phrase! were! lost! to! Khrushchev,! Senator!William! Fulbright! would! go! on! to! make! them! clear.! Talking! on! the! American!Broadcasting!Corporation’s!Sunday!morning!program,!the!Senator!stated:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.98.!28!Seymour!Hersh,!The'Dark'Side'of'Camelot,'p.257.!29!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.98.!30!The'Guardian,!British!newspaper,!‘Kennedy!Plans!Forces!Increase!of!217,000’,!July!26,!1961!reported!that!President!Kennedy!was!‘expressing!determination!to!defend!Western!rights!in!Berlin’.!31!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!32!Frederick!Kempe,!Berlin'1961,'p.243.!33!ibid.!34!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!
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The!truth!of!the!matter!is,!I!think,!the!Russians!have!the!power!to!close!it!in!any! case…next! week,! if! they! chose! to! close! their! borders,! they! could!without! violating! any! treaty.! I! don’t! understand!why!East!Germans!don’t!close!their!borders!because!I!think!they!have!the!right!to!close!them.35!!!This!suggests!that!Kennedy!had!redefined!the!parameters!and!rules!of!the!German!problem,! which! had! been! set! out! in! the! Potsdam! Agreement! leaving! Berlin!unstable! and! unsettled.36!He! had! explicitly!made! clear! that! the!U.S.!would! allow!
East!Berlin!to!be!cut!off!from!the!U.S.!commitment.!!By! restructuring! the!U.S.! definition! of! their! commitment! to! be! limited! to!
West! Berlin,! Kennedy! allowed! the! German! problem! to! reach! a! temporary!settlement.37!Seymour!Hersh!states!that!‘no!one!used!the!term!wall.!What!Kennedy!did! make! clear! was! that! they! [the! Soviets]! had! the! right! to! control! movement!through!their!sector’.38!As!Fredrick!Kempe!suggests,!Kennedy’s!policy!was!a!case!of,! ‘do!what!you!want!to!with!what! is!yours,!but!do!not! touch!what! is!ours’.39!By!stating! the! U.S.! commitment! clearly! and! publicly,! Kennedy! was! able! to!communicate! a! mutually! agreeable! solution! to! the! Soviets.40! He! allowed!Khrushchev! to! ‘save! face’! as! a! respected! leader! in! the!Eastern!Bloc!by! achieving!results!on!the!East!German!emigration!problem.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35!Frederick!Kempe,!Berlin'1961,'p.315.!36!The!‘German!problem’!has!deep!historic!undertones,!however!in!terms!of!Cold!War!tensions!the!German!problem!was!the!result!of!bad!planning!by!the!Allies!and!a!failure!to!understand!the!intentions!of!either!side!during!the!Potsdam!Conference.!The!Potsdam!Conference!took!place!in!1945!between!the!wartime!allies,!United!States,!Britain,!France,!and!the!Soviet!Union,!to!discuss!arrangements!on!the!postwar!settlement.!However!they!disagreed!on!the!fate!of!Berlin.!Berlin!was!divided!into!four!sectors!for!the!four!occupying!powers!however!in!June!1948,!Britain,!France,!and!the!U.S.!unified!their!zones!leaving!a!unified!Western!Berlin!facing!the!Communist!East!Berlin,!“The!Berlin!(Potsdam)!Conference,!July!17!–!August!2,!1945,!(a)!Protocol!of!the!Proceedings,!August!1,!1945.!The'Avalon'
Project:'Documents'in'Law,'History'and'Diplomacy,!1945.!!37!Kennedy!allowed!East!Berlin!to!be!blocked!off!from!the!West!in!order!to!ease!tensions!by!removing!Berlin!as!a!Cold!War!arena.!“The!Berlin!(Potsdam)!Conference,!July!17!–!August!2,!1945,!(a)!Protocol!of!the!Proceedings,!August!1,!1945.!!38!Seymour!Hersh,!The'Dark'Side'of'Camelot,'p.259.!39!Frederick!Kempe,!Berlin'1961,'p.247.!40!ibid.!
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Not! only! is! it! crucial! in! deterrence! theory! to! communicate! one’s!commitments,! it! is!also!important!to!stress!why!that!commitment!is!significant.41!Lebow!argues!that!policy!makers!emphasise!or!even!exaggerate!the!vital!nature!of!the!commitment!in!order!to!enhance!its!credibility.42!!When! a! homeland! is! challenged,! the! threat! of! retaliation! is! naturally!credible!as!the!stakes!are!understandably!high.43!However,!a!deterrer’s!willingness!to! risk! harm! for! the! sake! of! an! ally! is! inherently! less! credible.44! Therefore,! it! is!necessary!to!clearly!declare!the!strong!conviction!a!state!holds!in!maintaining!its!commitment.45! Kennedy! communicated! explicitly! why! the! Berlin! commitment!could! not! be! conceded.46! In! the! context! of! the! Cold!War,! Kennedy! placed! Berlin!right!at! the!centre.! In!his! July!address!he!stated,! ‘it! is!not! just! the!safety!of!a!city!that! is!at!stake.! It! is! the!safety!of! the!whole!West’.47!He!communicated!the!wider!implications! that! the! West! Berlin! commitment! held,! in! order! to! stress! its!significance,!stating,!‘For!the!fulfillment!of!our!pledge!to!that!city!is!essential!to!the!moral! and! security!of!Western!Germany,! to! the!unity!of!Western!Europe,! and! to!the!faith!of!the!entire!Free!World’.48!By!doing!so,!he!raised!the!status!of!the!Berlin!issues!from!a!European!stalemate!to!a!matter!of!U.S.!national!security!and!Western!liberty.! Kennedy!made! connections! between! the! importance! he! placed! on!West!Berlin!and!how!secure! it!was!saying,! ‘It! is!as!secure,! in!that!sense,! for!we!cannot!separate!its!safety!from!our!own’.49!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!pp.89\90.!42!ibid.!43!Terrence!Roehrig,!From'Deterrence'to'Engagement,!p.19.!44!ibid.!45!ibid.!46!ibid.!47!!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”;!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August,!p.114.!48!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!49!Curtis!Cate,!The'Ides'of'August,!p.114.!
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Raising!the!geopolitical!stakes!on!the!U.S.!position!in!Berlin!worked!to!give!Khrushchev!pause!before!he!considered!any!direct!attempt!to!limit!this!position.50!According!to!Lebow,!‘whenever!possible!commitments!should!be!linked!to!national!interest! as! a! demonstration! of! resolve’.51! Furthermore,! Schelling! suggests! that!leaders! of! a! deterrent! nation! can! make! public! pronouncements,! declaring! that!their!national!security!is!invested!in!the!survival!of!a!particular!state.52!In!order!to!reinforce! the! connection! between! the! U.S.! national! security! and! West! Berlin!Kennedy!said:!Our! position! in! Europe! is!worth! a! nuclear!war! because! if! you! are! driven!from! Berlin,! you! are! driven! from! Germany.! And! if! you! are! driven! from!Europe,!you!are!driven!from!Asia!and!Africa,!and!then!our!time!will!come!next.53!!By!making! the!West! Berlin! commitment! synonymous!with!U.S.! national! security!and!liberty!in!Western!Europe,!Kennedy!forced!Khrushchev!to!consider!that,!short!of!war,!pressure!could!not!force!the!United!States!to!abandon!its!commitment.54!It!was!no!longer!a!matter!of!territory,!but!one!of!freedom!itself.!!By!tying!together!the!freedom!of!West!Berlin!and!the!fate!of!U.S.!prestige,!the!President!could!now!not!allow!himself!to!be!seen!as!bending!to!Soviet!pressure!on!West!Berlin!without!huge!backlash!domestically.55!Kennedy!argued! that!West!Berlin!had!‘become!–!as!never!before!–!the!great!testing!place!of!Western!courage!and!will,! a! focal! point,!where! our! solemn! commitments! stretching!back!over! the!years!since!1945,!and!the!Soviet!ambitions!now!meet!in!basic!confrontation’.56!By!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!50!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.85.!51!ibid.!52!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.69;!Frederick!Kempe,!Berlin'1961,'p.55.!53!John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!54!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.69;!Frederick!Kempe,!Berlin'1961,'p.55.!55!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.123.!56!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!
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declaring! this! belief! publicly,!Kennedy! raised! the! stakes!not! only! for! the! Soviets,!but!for!the!U.S.!as!well.57!Concessions!made!on!West!Berlin’s!freedom!would!come!at! great! cost! to! Kennedy’s! presidential! prestige,! both! domestically! and!internationally.58! Kennedy! deliberately! backed! himself! into! a! corner,! making! it!clear!to!Khrushchev!that!he!had!no!room!to!move!on!West!Berlin,!and!thus!making!it! credible! that! he! would! indeed! retaliate! with! force! if! Khrushchev! decided! to!challenge! him! on! this.59! Elli! Lieberman! coined! the! phrase! ‘audience! cost’,! to!describe!when!leaders!generate!credibility!for!deterrence.!He!asserts!that!leaders,!especially! in! democracies,! will! be! punished! at! home! if! they! renege! on! a!commitment.60! Furthermore,! Shelling! asserts! that! ‘staking! your! reputation! on! a!commitment! is! a! means! of! convincing! a! challenger! of! the! seriousness! and!irreversibility!of!your!pledge’.61!Kennedy!was!making! it! clear! to!Khrushchev! that!he!(Kennedy)!could!not!walk!away!without!facing!repercussions,!not!only!from!his!country,!but!also!from!the!other!Western!nations.62!!!Eisenhower’s! response! to! Khrushchev’s! 1958! Berlin! ultimatum!simultaneously! talked!down! the!dangers! in!order! to! avoid! creating!public! alarm,!whilst!reaffirming!the!U.S.!position!on!Berlin.63!This!indicates!a!sense!of!confidence!that! Khrushchev! would! avoid! the! ultimate! risk.64! Richardson! points! out! that!Western! interests! were! articulated! more! precisely! by! Kennedy,! military!preparations!were!broadcasted,!the!risks!were!confronted!more!candidly,!and!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!57!Elli!Lieberman,!Reconceptualising'Deterrence,'p.24.!58!ibid.!59!ibid.!60!ibid.!61!Thomas!Schelling,!The'Strategy'of'Conflict,!pp.35\39.!62!ibid.!63!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.426.!64!The!Ultimate!risk!refers!to!Nuclear!War!wit!the!United!States;!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.426.!
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In! these! circumstances,! it! was! important! for! the! President! to! design! an!effective! and! formidable!defence! structure,!which!allowed! for! gradual! escalation!starting! with! conventional! measures! below! the! nuclear! threshold.8! Kennedy!wanted!to!prove!that!he!was!willing!to!meet!the!Soviet!leader’s!challenge!without!risking!‘the!lives!of!millions!of!Americans!over!a!dispute!about!highway!access![to!Berlin]! …! or! because! the! Germans!want! to! reunite! Germany’.9! Flexible' Response!was!designed! to! increase! the!U.S.! capacity! to! provide! a!wider! range!of! potential!responses! to! varying! levels! of! challenges! in! order! to! enhance! deterrent!credibility.10!!A! significant! element! of! deterrence! theory! is! the! assumption! of!rationality.11!It!is!vital!to!communicate!to!the!potential!aggressor!that!the!costs!of!challenging! a! commitment! outweigh! the! benefits.! To!make! clear!what! the! result!will!be!as!the!aggressor!makes!an!assumed!rational!calculation!about!the!risks!and!benefits!of!an!aggressive!action.!In!other!words,!having!defence!structures!in!place!that! will! tip! the! balance!making! the! risks! too! high! to! pursue! for! the! aggressor.!Kennedy! achieved! this! in! his! July! Address,! demonstrating! that! his! defence!structures!would!work!as!‘trip\wires’!to!further!escalation.12!Kennedy’s!early!political!writings!suggest!that!he!had!an!understanding!of!the!importance!of!tailoring!capabilities!to!commitments!in!order!for!a!deterrence!policy! to! function! effectively.! In!Why' England' Slept! (1940),! Kennedy! used! the!failure!of!appeasement!policies!in!the!late!1930s!as!an!example!of!the!necessity!of!a!formidable!defence!structure.13!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!James!Richardson,!Crisis'Diplomacy,!p.210;!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!
Deterrence,!p.417.!!9!Michael!Schwarz!and!Konstantin!Sonin,!“A!Theory!of!Brinkmanship,!Conflicts!and!Commitments”,!The'Journal'of'Law,'Economics'and'Organization,!Vo.24,!No.1,!2008:!163\183,!p.73.!10!Joseph!Siracusa!and!David!Coleman,!Scaling'the'Nuclear'Ladder,!p.285.!11!Henry!Kissinger,!The'Necessity'For'Choice,!pp.40\41.!12!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,'p.99.!13!John!F.!Kennedy,!Why'England'Slept,!New!York,!Wilfred!Funk,!1940,!p.229.!
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As!Kennedy!asserted:!We!must!always!keep!our!armaments!equal!to!our!commitments.!Munich!should! teach! us! that,! we! must! realize! that! any! bluffs! will! be! called.! We!cannot! tell! anyone! to!keep!out!of! our!hemisphere!unless!our! armaments!and! the! people! behind! these! armaments! are! prepared! to! back! up! the!command,!even!to!the!ultimate!point!of!going!to!war.14!!!Consequently,! Kennedy’s! reaction! to! the! 1961! Berlin! Crisis! was! to! increase! the!defence! structure! in!Berlin,! via! a! build\up!of! conventional! forces,! demonstrating!the!high!level!of!importance!he!placed!on!the!U.S.!presence!in!West!Berlin.!In! his! transition! meeting! with! outgoing! President! Dwight! Eisenhower,!Kennedy! was! shocked! to! learn! the! extent! of! U.S.! deterrence! policy! limitations,!either! nuclear! annihilation! of! political! humiliation.15! He! was! also! critical! of! the!arguments! behind! the! Massive' Retaliation! defence! structure! that! the! former!deterrence! policy! in! Berlin! offered.16! Kennedy! had! always! considered! a! flexible!position!as!vital!to!diplomatic!success.17!This!attitude!is!apparent!in!his!precursor!policy,!Strategy'of'Peace,!where!he!argued,!‘we!need!to!increase!the!flexibility!and!range!of!weapons! in!our!arsenal! in!order! to! increase!our! flexibility!and!range!of!diplomatic!possibilities’.18!!This!reflects!Kennedy’s!reluctance!to!use!nuclear!weapons!as!a!usable!form!of! defence.19! As! President,! Kennedy! believed! that! the! Cold! War! needed! to! be!placed!back!into!the!conventional!arena!and!removed!from!the!nuclear!one.20!The!








as!he!believed!in!U.S.!missile!superiority!and!remained!calm!in!the!knowledge!that!the!Soviets,!although!reluctant!to!admit!it,!knew!this!too.30!!As!a!result,!Eisenhower’s!defence!structure!was!an!effective!deterrent,!as!the! Soviets! believed! that! he! and! John! Foster! Dulles! would! be! prepared! to! use!nuclear! weapons! if! provoked! sufficiently.31! However,! with! the! advent! of! the!Kennedy! administration,! this! defence! structure! was! no! longer! perceived! as! a!credible!threat,!as!the!U.S.!deterrence!posture,!under!the!Kennedy!administration,!was!no! longer!perceived! as! sufficiently! convincing.! The!perception!of!Kennedy’s!resolve,!particularly!towards!nuclear!retaliation,!was!diametrically!opposed!to!the!
Massive' Retaliation! deterrence! policy.32! Evidence! of! this! can! be! found! in! a! C.I.A.!report!in!which!the!Soviet!defector,!Oleg!Penkovsky,!explained!that!Khrushchev!no!longer!believed!in!the!U.S.!determination!to!defend!their!Berlin!Commitment!to!the!point! of! retaliating! against! provocation! with! a! nuclear! attack.33! Kennedy!understood!that!although!the!U.S.!had!a!significant!stockpile!of!nuclear!weapons,!this!was!insignificant!so!long!as!Khrushchev!doubted!his!resolve!to!use!them.34!!In!order!for!deterrence!policies!to!effectively!protect!commitments,! there!must! be! sufficient! reprisal! capabilities! in! place! to! give! potential! challengers!pause.35! According! to! Lebow,! failure! to! develop! defence! capabilities! for!commitments! can! encourage! potential! challengers! to! question! your! resolve.36!However,! if! resolve! is! perceived! as! low! initially,! the! original! defence! structure!needs!to!be!reinvigorated!for!the!deterrence!policy!to!be!effective.37!!It! may! be! necessary! to! restore! and! even! increase! the! assured! reprisal!forces! to! compensate! for! any! deficiency! in! credibility,! in! order! to! demonstrate!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,'p.426,428.!31!ibid.!32!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.94.!33!ibid.!!34!ibid.!35!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.88.!36!ibid.!37!Richard!R.!Rosecrance,!Strategic'Deterrence'Reconsidered,'p.12.!
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!This! was! done! to! demonstrate! to! the! U.S.S.R.,! and! to! Khrushchev! in!particular,! that! U.S.! deterrence! policy! now! included! a! larger! array! of! options.45!Kennedy! intended! that! these! options! should! be! perceived! as! realistic!possibilities.46!He!worked!to!regain!the!loss!of!credibility!his!hesitancy!towards!the!use!nuclear!weapons!had!incurred.47!!He! aimed! for! a! build! up! of! conventional! forces! that! could! match!Khrushchev!at!a!‘manageable!level’.48!Stating,!We! need! the! capability! of! placing! in! any! critical! area! at! the! appropriate!time!a! force!which,! combined!with! those!of! our! allies,! is! large! enough! to!make! clear! our! determination! and! our! ability! to! defend! our! rights! at! all!costs!\!and!to!meet!all!levels!of!aggressor!pressure!with!whatever!levels!of!force!are!required.!We! intend!to!have!a!wider!choice! than!humiliation!or!all!out!nuclear!action.49!!!This!tactic!was!so!decisive!that!deterrence!theorists!George!and!Smoke!argue!that!it!is!difficult!to!imagine!what!more!the!incoming!administration!could!have!done!in!1961!to!reinforce!deterrence.50!Hence,!the!general!philosophy!of!Flexible'Response!was!avoiding!reliance!on!a!military!response!too!big!to!be!credible!or!wise—that!is,!solely!relying!upon!the!nuclear!option.51!The! 1961! Berlin! Crisis! was! not! a! provocation! of! nuclear! proportion.52!Although! Khrushchev! wanted! to! avoid! nuclear! war,! he! was! not! deterred! from!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,'p.130.!46!ibid.!47!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,!p.99.!48!Michael!O’Brien,!Rethinking'Kennedy,!pp.129\130.!49!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Radio!and!Television!Report!to!The!American!People!on!The!Berlin!Crisis,!July!25!1961”.!!50!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.428.!51!Thomas!Schelling,!“Controlled!Response!and!Strategic!Warfare,”!The'Adelphi'
Papers,!Vol.5,!No.19,!1965:!3\11,!pp.73\74.!52!Khrushchev!was!attempting!a!subtler!shift!in!the!balance!of!power!within!Berlin.!He!was!cautious!not!to!provoke!a!nuclear!war!and!as!such,!targeted!the!inflexibility!of!the!Massive!Retaliation!deterrence!policy!so!that!Kennedy!would!have!to!choose!conceding!rather!than!start!a!nuclear!war.!This!was!different!to!the!Cuban!Missile!Crisis.!Soviet!actions!during!the!Cuban!Missile!Crisis!directly!affected!U.S.!national!security.!The!installation!of!ICBM’s!in!Cuba!would!make!the!U.S.!early!warning!system!ineffective!and!as!a!result!Kennedy!had!all!options!on!the!table.!!
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pushing!Kennedy!on!less!apparent!issues!to!gain!concessions!that!would!indirectly!lead!to!West!Berlin!falling!into!Soviet!hands.53!He!felt!sure!that!Kennedy!would!not!deploy!Massive'Retaliation,!risking!American!lives,!for!the!sake!of!a!peace!treaty.54!However,!Khrushchev!knew!that! if!he!pushed! too! far,!ultimately,!Kennedy!might!succumb! to! pressure! from! hard\line! domestic! politicians! and! retaliate! with!nuclear!force.55!The!aide\memoire!challenge!was!therefore!an!indirect!push,!below!the!nuclear! threshold! for! absolute! retaliation,! in! an! attempt! to! see! a! shift! in! the!balance!of!power! in!Europe! towards!Soviet!advantage.56!As!a! result,!Khrushchev!opted! for! a! ‘sub\limited’57! way! to! change! Germany’s! status! quo.58! The! Soviet!brokered!German!peace! treaty,!within! the! aide\memoire,!would!work! to! change!the!accepted!political!arrangement!by!incidentally!ending!U.S.!occupation!rights!in!West!Berlin,!making!Soviet!invasion!redundant.59!Khrushchev!believed!pressuring!below!the!threshold!of!nuclear!reprisals!would!enable!him!to!manipulate!Kennedy!into!agreeing!to!Soviet!demands.60!This!strategy!relied!on!Khrushchev’s!perception!of!the!vulnerability!of!the!U.S.!deterrence!policy.61!!As!Khrushchev!was!not!provoking!a!nuclear!war,!a!nuclear!retaliation!was!not! necessary.! Instead,! Kennedy! needed! a!myriad! of! strategies! to! combat!more!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!53!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.94.!54!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.539.!55!!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.45.!56!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,'p.417.!57!Sub\limited!here!refers!to!conflicts!at!the!low!end!of!the!violence!spectrum.!58!These!‘Sub\limited’!challenges!were!attacks!that!were!considered!below!the!threshold!for!nuclear!retaliation.!With!no!measures!in!place!to!combat!these,!it!was!perceived!by!Khrushchev!as!a!viable!avenue!of!pursuit!to!gain!concessions!out!of!the!U.S.!foreign!policy.!!59!!Aide\memoire,!Soviet!Union!to!the!United!States,!Handed!by!Premier!Khrushchev!to!President!Kennedy!at!Vienna,!4!Jun!1961”,!pp.729\733.!60!!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.45.!61!Khrushchev!believed!that!Kennedy!lacked!the!hawkish!nature!of!the!Eisenhower!administration!and!would!therefore!forego!a!challenge!that!was!below!the!threshold!for!nuclear!provocation.!This!view!was!strengthened!by!Kennedy’s!apparent!empathy!for!Soviet!tensions!on!the!East!German!mass\exodus!into!West!Berlin!and!his!well\known!reluctance!to!use!nuclear!weapons.!Consequently,!Kennedy!would!need!to!reinvent!the!U.S.!deterrence!policy!to!compensate!for!the!gap!between!giving!in!and!nuclear!annihilation.!!
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subversive! challenges.62! George! and! Smoke! argue! that! the! Kennedy!Administration!was!committed!to!introduce!polices,!‘that!could!deter!“sub\limited”!conflict! at! the! low! end! of! the! spectrum!of! violence’.63!What’s!more,! two!months!prior! to! the! July! Address! Kennedy! signaled! his! belief! in! the! need! for! these!additional!conventional!forces.64!!Kennedy’s! Flexible' Response! deterrence! policy! changed! from! the! basic!calculation:! it!was! no! longer! a!matter! of!whether! the! threat! of!nuclear! reprisals!was! credible,! but! whether! there! was! a! real! likelihood! of! the! U.S.! deploying!
conventional! forces.65! Nonetheless,! a! crucial! component! of! the! Flexible' Response!deterrence!policy!was!the!maintenance!of!nuclear!capabilities!in!order!to!maintain!the!balance!of!assured!destruction.66!!The!rationale!behind!Kennedy’s!flexible!approach!was!set!out!in!a!letter!to!Lauris! Norstad,! the! Supreme! Commander! of! Allied! Powers! in! Europe,! on! 20!October!1961.67!In!the!letter,!Kennedy!states:!!!At! this! juncture! I! place! as!much! importance! on! developing! our! capacity!and!readiness!to! fight!with!significant!non\nuclear! forces!as!on!measures!designed!primarily!to!make!our!nuclear!deterrent!more!credible.!In!saying!this,! I! am! not! in! any! sense! depreciating! the! need! for! realization! by! the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.39.!63!ibid.!64!In!a!speech!on!Urgent'National'Needs!to!Congress!on!May!25,!1961,!Kennedy!stated!that!the!U.S.!needed:!‘A!further!reinforcement!of!our!own!capacity!to!deter!or!resist!non\nuclear!aggression…I!am!directing!the!Secretary!of!Defense!to!undertake!a!reorganization!and!modernization!of!the!Army’s!divisional!structure,!to!increase!its!non\nuclear!firepower,!to!improve!its!tactical!mobility!in!any!environment,!to!insure!its!flexibility!to!meet!any!direct!or!indirect!threat…to!expand!rapidly!and!substantially,!in!cooperation!with!out!Allies,!the!orientation!of!existing!forces!for!the!conduct!of!non\nuclear!war,!paramilitary!operations!and!sub\limited!or!unconventional!wars’.!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!President!Kennedy’s!Special!Message!to!the!Congress!on!Urgent!National!Needs,!May!25,!1961”,!John'F.'Kennedy'Library'Presidential'Library'Museum,!1961.!!65!Alexander!George!and!Richard!Smoke,!Deterrence,!p.39.!66!James!Richardson,!Crisis'Diplomacy,!p.210.!67!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.185.!“Letter!From!President!Kennedy!to!the!Supreme!Commander,!Allied!Powers!Europe!(Norstad),!Washington,!October!20,!1961”,!U.S.'Department'
of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,!1961.!!
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U.S.S.R.!of!the!tremendous!power!of!our!nuclear!forces!and!our!will!to!use!them,! if! necessary,! in! support! of! our! objectives.! Indeed,! I! think! the! two!aspects!are!interrelated.!It!seems!evident!to!me!that!our!nuclear!deterrent!will! not! be! credible! to! the! Soviets! unless! they! are! convinced! of! NATO's!readiness!to!become!engaged!on!a!lesser!level!of!violence!and!are!thereby!made!to!realize!the!great!risks!of!escalation!to!nuclear!war.68!!!Kennedy! could! now! meet! Khrushchev’s! aide\memoire! challenge! with! choices!beyond!either!backing!down!or!overreacting!with!nuclear!reprisals.69!As!early!as!spring! 1961,! Kennedy! spoke! of! the! need! to! be! able! to! proportion! any! military!response! to! its! provocation.70! He! advocated! ‘graduated! deterrence’! meaning! a!sequence!of!threatened!responses!to!aggression!rather!than!a!commitment!to!leap!into!all!out!war.71!!Furthermore,!at!the!National!Security!Council!meeting!on!the!19!July!1961,!it!was!agreed!that!the!changes!to!the!N.A.T.O.!ground!forces!in!Berlin!would!give!the! U.S.! ‘the! ability! to! fight! conventional! war! for! several! weeks! against! any!increased!escalation!of!Soviet!aggression’.72!!Kennedy! often! referred! to! Churchill’s! strategy! of! ‘arming! to! parley’.73!Kennedy!believed!it!was!vital!to!negotiate!from!a!position!of!strength!in!order!to!achieve! diplomatic! success.74! Acheson! convinced! Kennedy! not! to! negotiate!with!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.185.!69!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.99.!70!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.185;!Thomas!Schelling,!“Controlled!Response!and!Strategic!Warfare,”!pp.73\74.!71!‘What!I!want!is!a!sequence!of!graduated!responses!to!Soviet/GDR!actions!in!denial!of!our!rights!of!access.!The!purpose!is!to!maintain!our!rights!and!preserve!our!alliance’,!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.185;!Thomas!Schelling,!“Controlled!Response!and!Strategic!Warfare,”!pp.73\74.!
72'Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.77.!“Memorandum!of!Minutes!of!the!National!Security!Council!Meeting,!Washington,!July!19,!1961”,!U.S.'Department'of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,!1961.!73!“John!F.!Kennedy!Speeches:!Face\to\Face,!Nixon\Kennedy"!Vice!President!Richard!M.!Nixon!and!Senator!John!F.!Kennedy!Fourth!Joint!Television\Radio!Broadcast,!October!21,!1960”,!John'F.'Kennedy'Presidential'Library'and'Museum,!1960.'!74!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.92,!96.!
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defensive,! won! by! strong! will! and! tough! attitude.84! West! Berlin! would! be!safeguarded!by!a! similarly!unrelenting!commitment.85!By!harking!back! to!a! time!when! the!U.S.S.R.! and! the!U.S.!were! allies,! Kennedy!was! suggesting! that! the! two!superpowers!could!again!work!towards!collective!prosperity.86!!Lebow!argues!that!when!policy!makers!receive!new!information!they!are!expected! to! reformulate! their! perceptions! of! the! risks! and!make! ‘more! complex!and! sophisticated! judgments! about! the! implications! of! the! various! policy!alternatives! they! considered’.87! Kennedy! believed! that! he! had! to! bolster! the!conventional!defence!component!of!his!deterrence!policy!to!sway!Khrushchev!into!concluding! that! the! benefits! of! challenging! West! Berlin! no! longer! added! up! to!success.88!!Kennedy!worked! to! connect! the! new! levels! of! conventional! defence! that!were! being! deployed! in! the! U.S.! sector! of! Berlin! to! new! heightened! risks!Khrushchev! faced! if!he!continued! to! insists!on!challenging!U.S.! rights!of!access.89!By! doing! so,! he! fulfilled! Schelling’s! notion! that! if! commitments! are! ‘manifestly!connected! to! the! machinery! of! war! it! should! work! like! a! physical! barrier’.90!Moreover,! reflecting! on! the! events! from! 1961! in! a! North! Atlantic! Council!ministerial!meeting!on!5!May!1962,!Robert!McNamara!stated,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!83!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.100.!84!The!Battle!of!Bastogne,!or!Battle!of!the!Bulge,!was!a!military!engagement!between!US!and!German!forces!from!20\27!December!1944!at!Bastogne!in!Belgium.!Although!heavily!outnumbered,!U.S.!along!with!Allied!forces!were!victorious!over!the!Germans.!The!Battle!of!Stalingrad!was!similar!in!that!the!Soviet!forces!was!surrounded!and!heavily!outnumbered!by!German!forces.!It!took!place!on!August!1942!to!2!February!1943!and!like!Bastogne!the!Soviets!were!able!to!hold!out!and!eventual!stage!a!counter\offensive,!leading!to!the!Soviet!invasion!of!Germany,!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'a'President,'p.100.!85!By!citing!the!Battle!of!Bastogne,!Kennedy!was!implying!that!although!a!numerically!superior!enemy,!like!in!1944,!surrounded!Berlin!the!U.S.!would!again!prevail!through!their!strong!willed!determination,!Nicholas!Labinski,!Evolution'of'
a'President,'p.101.!86!ibid.!87!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.101.!88!ibid.!89!Thomas!Schelling,!Arms'and'Influence,'p.99.!90!ibid.!
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The'Need'to'Demonstrate'Resolve'!! Khrushchev!worried! that!he!had!misjudged!Kennedy!at!Vienna,! although!he!still!remained!unconvinced!of!the!Kennedy!administration!resolve.!Petr!Lunák!argues! that! by! August! 1961,! Khrushchev! began! to! doubt! his! original! assertion!about!Kennedy’s!willingness!to!defend!the!U.S.!position!in!Berlin.1!The!final!major!requirement! for! a! deterrence! policy! to! be! considered! successful! is! the!demonstration! of! resolve! to! carry! out! defensive! measures! when! challenged.2!Terrence! Roehrig! asserts! that! this! requirement! is! the! most! difficult,! as!communicating!an!explicit!commitment!and!backing! it!up!with!sufficient!defence!capabilities!does!not!necessarily!ensure!acceptance!of!the!deterrence!threat!in!the!adversary’s!mind.3! A! state!must! demonstrate! resolve! to! defend! its! commitment!against! all! challenges! in! order! to! gain! definitive! credibility.4! Under! Soviet!direction,! the!East!German! state! embarked!upon!a! campaign!of!harassment! as! a!means! to! test!whether! the!U.S.!would!defend! their! rights! in!Berlin.5!Utilising! the!
Flexible' Response! policy,! the! U.S.! resisted! Soviet! pressure,! effectively! deterring!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Petr!Lunák,!“Khrushchev!and!the!Berlin!Crisis”,!p.74.!2!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.97.!3!Terrence!Roehrig,!From'Deterrence'to'Engagement,!pp.18\19.!4!Robert!Jervis!has!found!that!deterrence!crises!‘arise!if!an!aggressor!believes!that!the!status!quo!powers!are!weak!in!capability!or!resolve.!This!belief!will!lead!the!former!to!test!opponents,!usually!starting!with!small!and!apparently!unimportant!issues.!The!state!must!display!the!ability!and!willingness!to!wage!war’.!The!status\quo!power,!in!this!case!the!U.S.,!can!not!afford!to!ignore!minor!conflicts!as!‘Issues!of!little!intrinsic!value!become!highly!significant!as!indices!of!resolve’!within!deterrence!crises,!Robert!Jervis,!Perception'and'Misperception,'p.58.!5!The!nature!of!the!harassment!was!pure!intimidation.!Under!Khrushchev’s!order!Soviet!and!East!German!forces!began!harassing!the!U.S.!and!the!Allies!just!below!provocation.!For!example!in!the!airspace!corridors,!Soviet!military!aircrafts!would!fly!within!metres!of!U.S.!military!aircrafts!in!an!attempt!to!intimidate!the!pilots!into!landing!and!disrupting!their!activities.!However!it!was!very!clear!that!the!pilots!should!try!everything!to!disrupt!the!U.S.!access!rights!without!provoking!conflict,!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August,!p.459,!486.!
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Khrushchev! from! further! challenges! to! the! status! quo! in! West! Berlin.6! Arnold!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush!conclude!that!during!the!course!of!the!Berlin!Crisis!the!Soviet!leadership!‘became!sufficiently!convinced!of!the!quality!of!U.S.!will!to!resist’!due!to!the!strong!deterrence!policy!of!the!Kennedy!administration.7!! Kennedy!understood!the!importance!of!demonstrating!resolve!in!Berlin!in!order!for!commitments!to!be!credible.8!In!The!Strategy'of'Peace'(1960),!Kennedy!stated,! ‘I! think! you! must! demonstrate! your! determination! to! fight,! otherwise!you’re!holding!a!very!tenuous!position!in!Berlin’.9!!One! of! the! most! significant! challenges! Kennedy! faced! was! the! Soviet!decision! to! resume! nuclear! testing.10! His! administration’s! response! to! this! and!other!challenges!would!set!the!U.S.!Berlin!position!in!stone.11!!!On!Monday!afternoon,!28!August!1961,!President!Kennedy!was! informed!that! an! American! listening! post! had! reported! a! possible! announcement! of! the!Soviet!government’s!plan!to!start!a!new!series!of!nuclear!tests.12!This!move!by!the!U.S.S.R.!was! in! defiance! of! the! voluntary!moratorium!on!nuclear! testing! that! the!two! superpowers! had! observed! since! 1958.13! Kennedy! confided! in! his! brother,!Robert,! that!Khrushchev!was!obviously!attempting! to! intimidate! the!West.14!The!official! announcement! came! from!Khrushchev!on!30!August!1961.!Over! the!next!three! months! the! Soviet! Union! conducted! thirty\one! nuclear! tests.! The! most!politically! provocative! test! involved!detonating! a! fifty\eight!megaton!bomb.!This!bomb,! the! largest! ever! to! be! exploded,!was! four! thousand! times!more! powerful!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Arnold!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,!p.126.!7!ibid.!8!John!F.!Kennedy,!The'Strategy'of'Peace,!p.213.!9!ibid.!10!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.291.!11!By!demonstrating!his!resolve,!Kennedy!showed!a!pattern!for!following!through!on!his!determination!not!to!be!intimidated,!setting!the!precedence!for!future!challenges,!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'pp.291\293.!12!ibid,'p.291.!13!ibid.!14!ibid,!p.293.!
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than! the! one! dropped! on! Hiroshima.15! Although! the! nuclear! testing! was! not! a!direct! challenge! to! the! U.S.! commitment! to! West! Berlin,! it! was! part! of! a! long!running! campaign! of! intimidation! in! which! Berlin! played! an! integral! role.16! As!such,!Khrushchev’s!actions!can!be!perceived!as!a!test!of!Kennedy’s!resolve!to!stand!fast.! This! is! evident! in! a! report! by!U.S.! nuclear! scientists! to!Kennedy! that! stated!resumption!of! tests!would!have!had! to!be!planned!prior! to! the!Vienna!summit.17!The! implication!was!clearly!that!the!decision!to!restart!nuclear!tests!was!aligned!with! Khrushchev’s! prejudgment! of! Kennedy’s! character! based! on! his! past!performances.18! ! He! hoped! a! show! of! nuclear! force! would! scare! Kennedy! into!submission.19!!!On!31!August,! in! the!wake!of!Khrushchev’s!announcement,!Kennedy!met!with! his! National! Security! Council! to! discuss! the! motivation! behind! the!announcement.!Vice!President!Lyndon! Johnson!asserted! that!Khrushchev’s!move!‘might!be!a!reaction!to!their!failure!to!intimidate!the!West!in!the!Berlin!situation’.20!Kennedy!considered!this!and!concluded!that!this!new!provocation!would!have!to!be! tackled! in! order! to! demonstrate! the!U.S.! determination!not! to! be! intimidated!out!of!Berlin.21!Michael!Beschloss!argues!that!Khrushchev’s!resumption!of!nuclear!testing! satisfied! his! growing! perception! of! a! need! to! intimidate! the!West!with! a!strong!show!of!Soviet!power.22!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!“Nuclear!Test!Ban!Treaty”,!John'F.'Kennedy'Presidential'Library'and'Museum,!1962.!!16!Other!main!areas!of!harassment!and!intimidation!were!the!airspace!corridor!access!right!and!the!access!rights!into!East!Berlin.!17!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.293.!18!ibid.!19!ibid.!20!ibid,!p.295.!21!ibid.!22!Andrei!Sakharov,!a!Soviet!nuclear!physicist!involved!in!the!crisis,!in!an!interview!on!Cold!War!tensions,!asserted!that!Khrushchev’s!decision!to!resume!nuclear!testing!was!purely!motivated!by!political!strategy!rather!than!a!need!to!further!Soviet!understanding!of!nuclear!weapons,!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.294.!
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and!military!stature!caused!by! the!collapse!of! the!missile!gap!myth’.45!Moreover,!by! the! end! of! 1961,! Khrushchev! had! recognized! that! the! old! claim! of! strategic!superiority!based!exclusively!on!the!Soviet!ICBM!force!was!no!longer!credible.46!While!Kennedy!did!not!compromise!his!position,!Khrushchev!certainly!had!to!compromise!his.47!To!stop!the!loss!of!East!Germany’s!best!and!brightest!to!the!West,!Khrushchev!had!to!resort!to!a!crude!alternative!to!maintain!control!over!the!population.48! Kennedy! was! well! aware! of! the! problem! Khrushchev! faced.49! The!President!confided!in!Walt!Rostow!saying:!!!Khrushchev! is! losing! East! Germany.! He! cannot! let! this! happen.! If! East!Germany!goes,!so!will!Poland!and!all!of!Eastern!Europe.!He!will!have!to!do!something! to! stop! the! flow!of! refugees.!Perhaps!a!wall.!And!we!won’t!be!able! to!prevent! it.! I! can!hold! the!alliance! together! to!defend!West!Berlin,!but!I!cannot!act!to!keep!East!Berlin!open.50!!!Between! midnight! and! 2am! on! 13! August! 1961,! East! German! soldiers!started!to!physically!divide!the!city!into!East!and!West!Berlin.51!Initially,!this!was!achieved! with! the! construction! of! a! barbed! wire! and! concrete! barricade! that!bordered! the!Allied!sectors!of! the!city.!This!barrier!was!built!exclusively!on!East!German!territory!and!the!Soviet!sector!of!the!city,!and!was!later!reinforced!with!a!more!permanent!structure.52!Khrushchev’s!Foreign!Policy!assistant,!Troyanovsky!said!that!the!Wall!‘saved!Khrushchev!face’!and!that!it!was!‘a!silent!recognition!that!he!had!not!achieved!his!basic!aim’.53!Andreas!Wenger!argues!that!the!construction!of! the! Wall! signaled! Soviet! acceptance! of! a! divided! Europe,! not! just! the! most!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,'p.85.!46!ibid,!p.98.!47!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,!p.265.!48!This!crude!alternative!was!the!construction!of!the!Wall!that!psychically!stopped!emigration,!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,!p.265.!49!ibid.!50!ibid.!51!Robert!Grathwol!and!Donita!Moorhus,!American'Forces'in'Berlin:'Cold'War'
Outpost,'1945W1994,'Washington,!Diane!Publishing,!1994,!p.86.!!52!Robert!Grathwol!and!Donita!Moorhus,!American'Forces'in'Berlin,!p.86.!53!William!Taubman,!Khrushchev,!p.306.!
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efficient! way! to! stop! the!mass! exodus! of! refugees! from! the! Soviet! sector.54! The!construction! of! the! Berlin! Wall! was! an! early! indication! that! the! U.S.! Flexible'
Response! policy! had! effectively! deterred! Khrushchev! from! pushing! the! German!peace!treaty!deadline,!and!thus!maintained!West!Berlin’s!freedom.55!!!In! the! tense! days! following! the! construction! of! the! Wall! there! was!significant!debate!over!whether!or!not!the!Wall!was!an!isolated!move!or!the!start!of!a!new!push!on!West!Berlin.56!The!Wall!was!seen!by!Kennedy!as!a!way!to!defuse!the! Berlin! Crisis,! and! as! such! was! deemed! as! acceptable! within! the! Flexible'




However,! to! reassure! the! international! community! regarding! the! U.S.!commitment! to!West!Berlin,!Kennedy!ordered!reinforcements! to! the! second!and!third!Battle!Groups!of!the!Berlin!Brigade.62!This!resulted!in!an!acceptable!impasse!where!the!Soviets!did!not!challenge!the!legality!of!Western!rights!and!the!West!did!not!seek!to!change!the!reality!of!Soviet!authority!in!East!Germany.63!When!it!was!claimed! that!his!decision!was!a! risk! to! the!U.S.!position! in!West!Berlin,!Kennedy!responded:!!Why!would!Khrushchev!put!up!a!wall! if!he!really! intended!to!seize!West!Berlin?!This!is!his!way!out!of!his!predicament.!It’s!not!a!very!nice!solution,!but!a!wall!is!a!hell!of!a!lot!better!than!a!war.64!!Khrushchev!further!tested!U.S.!resolve!by!harassing!Western!personnel!at!the!Friedrichstrasse!crossing!point!in!East!Berlin.65!The!East!German!Police!‘Vopos’,!








German!border!controls.79!On!24!October!East!German!police!stopped!twenty\six!Allied!vehicles!although!U.S.!military!personnel!ensured!they!were!escorted!across!the!border.80!!Beschloss!suggests!that!the!U.S.!approach!represented!‘the!most!important!communist! setback! since! the!border! closing’.81!On!25!October!1961! in!an!article!entitled! ‘MP’s! Defy! Berlin’s! Red! Border! Control! Police’,! the! Red' Bank' Register!newspaper! reported! ‘in! an! obvious! show! of! defiance! of! the! communist! border!control,! American! jeeps! escorted! private! civilian! vehicle! across! the! borders! at!Friedrichstrasse’.82! However,! by! 27! October! the! ten! U.S.! tanks! used! as! military!escorts!faced!a!similar!number!of!Soviet!tanks.83!!The!standoff!at!Checkpoint!Charlie! lasted!sixteen!hours,!and!remains!one!of!the!most!significant!shows!of!American!resolve!during!Kennedy’s!presidency.84!Just! as! the! standoff! appeared! to! be! reaching! a! climax,! Khrushchev! ordered! his!tanks!to!withdraw!saying:!!All! right! pull! back! your! tanks.! The! Americans! can’t! pull! theirs! back! for!reasons!of!prestige.85!!!The! confrontation!boosted! the! confidence!of!Berliners! in! the!U.S.! resolve!not! to! yield! to! Soviet! pressure! in! the! wake! of! confrontation.86! David! Brainard!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!79!Neil!Carmichael,!“A!Brief!History!of!the!Berlin!Crisis!of!1961”,!pp.2\5.!80!ibid.!81!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.334.!82!Red'Bank'Register,!“MPs!Defy!Berlin’s!Red!Border!Police”!Vol.84,!No.!85,!October!25,!1961,!p.1.!83!While!Clay!was!updating!Kennedy!on!the!situation!a!further!twenty!Soviet!tanks!rolled!up!to!the!border.!Clay’s!assessment!to!Kennedy!was!that,!‘This!proves!they!are!good!mathematicians…we!have!thirty!tanks!in!Berlin,!so!they!brought!up!twenty!more!tanks!so!that!they!will!have!a!tank!for!every!tank!we!have.!Clay!concluded!that!this!was!evidence!that!‘they!don’t!intend!to!do!anything!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.334;!Neil!Carmichael,!“A!Brief!History!of!the!Berlin!Crisis!of!1961”,!pp.2\5.!84!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August,'p.459,!486.!85!ibid.!
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concludes! that! the! incident! subsided! with! Khrushchev’s! decision! to! accept! U.S.!deterrence.87! Khrushchev! told! reporters! at! the! Kremlin’s! 40th! anniversary!celebration!of!the!Russian!Revolution!on!7!November!1961,!that:!!For!the!time!being,!it!is!not!good!for!Russians!and!the!United!States!to!push!each!other!in!regards!to!settling!the!Berlin!issue.88!!!The!confrontation!has!been!largely!seen!as!a!success!for!Kennedy,!as!it!confirmed!the!U.S.!would!not!succumb!to!any!pressure!on!its!occupying!rights!in!Berlin.89!!Although!the!Four\Powers!failed!to!negotiate!official!ground!access!routes,!they! were! able! to! establish! air! access! routes.90! However,! as! a! challenge! to!Kennedy’s!reinvigorated!deterrence!policy,!the!Soviets!began!to!dispute!the!West’s!free!access!airspace!corridors!around!Berlin.91!The!U.S.S.R.!attempted!to! institute!new!restrictions!on!Western!flights!coming!into!the!city,!while!authorizing!Soviet!fighters!to!buzz!Allied!aircraft!flying!through!approved!airspace!access!corridors.92!More! controversial! Soviet! harassment! of! Western! airspace! access! began! on! 7!February! 1962.93! The! Soviet! controller! at! the! Berlin! Air! Safety! Centre! (BASC)!broadcast! that! Soviet! military! aircraft! were! to! ‘engage’! the! southern! airspace!corridor!from!Frankfurt!to!Berlin!at!altitudes!up!to!7000!feet!for!three!and!a!half!hours!on!the!following!day.94!The!harassment!continued!with!repeats!on!9!and!12!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!86!William!R.!Smyser,!“Tanks!at!Checkpoint!Charlie”,!in!October!1961,!The!World!Faced!a!War”,!The'Atlantic'Times.!October!2005.!!!87!Michael!Beschloss,!The'Crisis'Years,'p.336.!88!ibid.!89!William!R.!Smyser,!“Tanks!at!Checkpoint!Charlie”.!!90!The!Four!Occupying!Powers!were!the!U.S.,!Britain,!France!and!the!Soviet!Union.!On!November!30th!1945,!the!U.S.S.R.!signed!a!written!agreement!on!the!creation!of!three!20\mile!wide!air!corridors!from!West!Germany,!providing!free!access!rights!to!Berlin!for!the!Western!Allies,!John!Proctor!American'Resolve'and'The'Art'of'War,!Bloomington,!Author!House,!2012,!p.53.!91!Curtis!Cate,'The'Ides'of'August,!p.459,!486.!92!ibid.!93!ibid.!94!While!Soviet!military!activities!in!these!areas!were!not!unprecedented,!the!decision!was!interpreted!by!the!Kennedy!administration!as!a!challenge!on!
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February!in!the!northern!and!central!corridors,!and!on!14!and!15!February!in!the!southern!corridor.95!The!Soviets!went!on! to!announce! that!Western!aircraft!now!required!prior!Soviet!approval!to!access!these!corridors.96!!By! restricting! access! to! the! city,! the! Soviets! hoped! to! force! the!Western!Allies! to! abandon! their! strong! stand! on! Berlin.97! This! new! offensive!was! a! last\ditch! attempt! to! test! Kennedy’s! resolve! and! to! salvage! a! negotiable! position! in!future! settlements! over!Berlin.98! This! is! confirmed! by! the! official! reports! on! the!conduct!of!the!Soviet!Union,!found!in!Foreign'Relations'of'the'United'States,!1961\1963,!Volume!V,!where! this! engagement!of! corridors! is! viewed!as! an!attempt! to!give!the!Soviets!more!gravity!in!future!negotiations.99!The! Kennedy! administration!was! concerned! about! the! new! offensive! on!their!access!rights.100!A!telegram!from!Walter!Dowling!to!the!Department!of!State!declared! that! he! regarded! ‘the! Soviet! actions! in! pre\empting! space,! denying!guarantees!of! flight!safety! in!south!corridor!and!buzzing!of!Allied!planes!as!most!serious!problem!we!have!faced!up!to!this!time!in!maintaining!access!to!Berlin’.101!!Rusk! informed! the! President! that,! ‘we! expect! to! react! sharply! and!immediately!so!that!they!have!no!false!conception!of!our!position!in!the!matter’.102!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Western!free!access!to!Berlin!airspace!corridors,!Charles!Sampson,!John!Joyce,!and!David!Patterson!(eds.),!“Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union”,!Department'of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,'Washington,!1998,!p.369.'95'Charles!Sampson,!John!Joyce,!and!David!Patterson!(eds.),!“Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union”,!p.369.!96!ibid.!97! Therefore! the! main! aims! by! restricting! access! was! to! see! the! Kennedy!administration! yield! their! avowed! determination! not! to! relent! any! rights!whilst!not!aggravating!conflict,!Charles!Sampson,!John!Joyce,!and!David!Patterson!(eds.),!“Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union”,!p.369.!98!ibid.!99!ibid.!100!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,'1961–1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961–1962,!Doc.299,!“Telegram!From!the!Embassy!in!Germany!to!the!Department!of!State,!Bonn,!February!19,!1962”,!U.S.'Department'of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,'1962.''101!ibid.!!102!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,'Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.!304,!“Memorandum!of!Conference!With!President!Kennedy,!
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Although! Kennedy! believed! the! Soviet! leader! had! accepted! the! removal! of! the!Western!presence!in!Berlin!was!not!an!option,!he!remained!suspicious!that!Soviet!harassment! was! an! attempt! to! lay! the! foundation! for! future! negotiations! that!would! favour! Soviet! ambitions.103! In! response! to! the! harassment,! the! U.S.!authorised!civilian!aircraft!to!fly!through!the!reserved!corridors!at!the!pre\empted!altitudes!with!military!escorts.104!This!continued!without!Soviet!approval.105!!Although!he!was!not!willing!to!risk!provoking!actual!conflict!by!engaging!with! Western! aircraft,! Khrushchev! was! seeking! to! pressurize! the! Western!powers.106! By! keeping! Berlin! as! a! current! issue,! the! new! offensive! on! Western!airspace!corridors!was!less!an!attempt!to!steer!the!crisis!towards!unilateral!Soviet!gains,!but!instead!an!attempt!to!lay!the!foundations!for!future!settlement.107!!Khrushchev,! still! not! sufficiently! convinced! of! Kennedy’s! resolve,!embarked! on! a! test! of!wills! to! decide! how! far! Kennedy’s! resolve!went.108! ! ! The!Kennedy! administration’s! firm! and! unhesitating! response! to! these! challenges!helped! cement! the! Flexible' Response! deterrence! approach! as! an! effective! and!successful!policy!in!combating!Soviet!aggressive!ambitions!in!Berlin.109!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Washington,!February!21,!1962”,'U.S.'Department'of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,!1962.'103!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States!1961\1963,!Vol.!XIV,'Berlin!Crisis,!1961\1962,!Doc.!304.!104!ibid.!105!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,'1961–1963,!Vol.!XIV,!Berlin!Crisis,!1961–1962,!Doc.299.!106Berlin!remained!a!‘bargaining!chip’,!which!could!ultimately!open!Western!leaders!up!to!more!equal!negotiations!in!future!settlements.!This!notion!is!confirmed!by!a!large!article!published!in!a!special!edition!of!Izvestia!released!on!February!11th,!which!suggested!that!the!Soviets!were!moving!away!from!demanding!unilateral!solutions!on!Berlin!and!towards!the!lack!of!a!mutually!agreeable!solution!on!the!West’s!part!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States.!1961\1963,!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union,!Doc.150.!“Memorandum!of!Conversation,!Washington,!January!20,!1962”,!Department'of'State,!Washington,!1962,!pp.85\87.!107!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963.!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union,!Doc.'127,!“Circular!Airgram!From!the!Department!of!State!to!All!Diplomatic!Posts,!Washington!November!8,!1961”,!U.S.'Department'of'State,'Office'of'the'Historian,'1961.!108!Petr!Lunák,!“Khrushchev!and!the!Berlin!Crisis”,!p.74.!109!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush!Strategic'Power,!p.126.!
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An!assessment!of!the!22nd!Communist!Party!Congress!by!U.S.!officials!on!8!November!1961,! concluded! that! the!build!up!of! forces!and! the!demonstration!of!U.S.!firmness!played!a!crucial!role!in!Khrushchev‘s!announcement!on!the!lifting!of!the!deadline!for!signing!a!separate!German!peace!treaty.110!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!110!Foreign!Relations!of!the!United!States,!1961\1963.!Vol.!V,!Soviet!Union,!Doc.'127.!!
Ich'Bin'Ein'Berliner:'Conclusion'! The! response!of! the!Kennedy!administration! following! the!publication!of!the! Soviet! aide\memoire! after! the! Vienna! summit! undermined! Khrushchev’s!strategy.! Kennedy!managed! the! crisis! by! combining! firmness!with! flexibility.! He!used! superior! U.S.! nuclear! capacity! as! a! diplomatic! tool.! Moreover,! he! used!conventional!means!to!raise!the!nuclear!threshold!and!control!the!speed!at!which!escalation!was!calculated.!Khrushchev’s! challenge! was! the! result! of! misperception! and! the!psychological!relationship!between!the!two\superpower!leaders!was!pivotal!to!the!duration,! intensity,! and! resolution! of! the! 1961! Berlin! Crisis.! The! effective!implementation! of! Flexible' Response! as! a! deterrence! policy! worked! to! form! a!credible!perception!of!Kennedy’s!resolve!and!character.!Khrushchev!backed!down!from!his!policy! goal! of! incorporating!West!Berlin! into! the!GDR,!once!he! realised!that!he!had!underestimated!Kennedy’s!determination!not! to!be!pressured!out!of!Berlin.!!Deterrence!theory!implies!a!psychological!relationship!and!it!is!important!to! assess! the! motivation! and! perception! behind! the! challengers’! and! deterrers’!decision\making!processes.1!When!deterrence!theory! is!applied!to! foreign!policy,!leaders!draw!on!cognitive!pathologies!to!understand!an!adversary’s!perceptions!of!their! resolve.2! This! understanding! can! tailor! deterrence! policy! that! responds! to!the!perception!behind!challengers!and!fixes!them!accordingly.3!!!Kennedy’s!understanding!of!Khrushchev’s!challenge!to!the!U.S.!position!in!Berlin!was!a!result!of!failing!to!demonstrate!a!strong!resolve!for!the!U.S.!position.!The! former!U.S.! deterrence! policy! of!Massive' Retaliation!was! not! credible! under!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Robert!Jervis,!Perception'and'Misperception,!p.113.!2!Patrick!!Morgan,!“Saving!Face!For!the!Sake!of!Deterrence”,!p.133.!!3!ibid.!
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the!Kennedy!administration!as!Khrushchev’s!no!longer!believed!in!the!U.S.!resolve!to!carry!through!on!the!deterrent!threat.!!Kennedy’s! July! Address! set! out! the! U.S.! commitment! in! Berlin.! The!President!defined!the! limitation!and!extent!of! the!U.S.!commitment!to!emphasise!to!the!Soviets! the! importance!that! the!U.S.!placed!on!their!position!and!to!clarify!what! was! a! high! value! commitment! and! what! was! flexible.! In! addition,! by!connecting! the! U.S.! position! in! Berlin! to! his! presidential! prestige,! Kennedy!increased! the! cost! of! disengagement! to! further! add! credibility! to! his! resolve! to!maintain! the! commitment.! By! removing! the! ambiguity! of! the! U.S.! commitments!parameters,! Kennedy! confronted! the! Soviet! challenge!more! directly! and! overtly,!giving! his! position! further! credibility! as! he! laid! out! explicit! guidelines! that!removed!the!possibility!of!the!Soviets!claiming!a!misunderstanding.!!President!Kennedy!understood!that!nuclear!reprisals!were!not!sufficient!to!combat! the! Soviet! challenge,! and! began! bolstering! U.S.! conventional! forces! in!Europe! to! undermine! Khrushchev’s! pressure! tactics.! This! enabled! his!administration! to! enact! flexible! polices! adapted! to! almost! any! Soviet! challenge!below! the! nuclear! threshold.! Flexible' Response! gave! Kennedy! the! option! to!maintain! the!U.S.! commitment!without! being! forced! into! a! nuclear! holocaust,! or!into!humiliation.! It!enabled!Kennedy!to!control!and!maintain!a!steady!escalation.!Although!conventional!forces!were!too!small!to!thwart!a!direct!Soviet!attack,!they!were! significant! enough! to! gain! credibility! as! ‘trip\wires’.! This! tactic! targeted!Khrushchev’s! sense! of! rationality! and! necessity! to! act! in! self\interest.! Such!flexibility! meant! that! the! risk! associated! with! embarking! upon! a! challenge! was!connected!to!U.S.!conventional!forces!and!a!policy!of!gradual!escalation.!!The!final!criterion!for! implementing!an!effective!deterrence!policy!within!an!immediate!deterrence!crisis!is!the!ability!to!demonstrate!resolve.4!Khrushchev!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!Richard!Lebow,!Between'Peace'and'War,!p.97.!
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embarked!upon!a!campaign!of!harassment!and! intimidation!as!a! test! to!see!how!far!Kennedy’s!resolve!would!go.! !This!was!a!desperate!attempt!by!Khrushchev!to!determine!if!his!original!perception!of!Kennedy!as!a!weak!opponent!was!accurate.!The!confrontations!that!followed!enabled!Kennedy!to!prove!Khrushchev!wrong!by!demonstrating! his! administration’s! capacity! and! willingness! to! meet! any!challenge.!However,!it!is!also!important!to!make!accommodations!within!deterrence!polices!when!they!interfere!with!an!adversary’s!vital!interests.!Faced!with!a!strong!U.S.! deterrence! policy! Khrushchev! reassessed! his! perception! and! decided! to! be!satisfied!with!merely!halting!East!German!immigration!through!the!Berlin!Wall.!By!remaining! defiant! throughout! the! harassment! and! intimidation,! the! Kennedy!administration!effectively!demonstrated!their!resolve!to!act!in!the!defence!of!their!commitment.!The!Soviet!leadership!became!convinced!of!the!U.S.!resolve!to!resist!and! act! on! any! challenge! on! the! freedom! of!West! Berlin! and! U.S.! access! rights,!allowing!Berlin!to!be!settled!and!removed!from!the!Cold!War!arena.!Kennedy! effectively! worked! through! the! necessary! criteria! in! an!immediate!deterrence!situation!to!gain!credibility!for!a!successful!and!formidable!deterrence!policy.!Horelick!and!Rush!assert! that! ‘during! the! course!of! the!Berlin!campaign!and!by!the!end!of!1961,!Soviet!leadership!became!sufficiently!convinced!of!the!quality!of!U.S.!will!to!resist’.5!!There! are! limitations! to! the! practicality! of! deterrence! theory.! The!assumption! of! rationality! by! theorists! limits! the! theory! as! applied! to! historical!cases,!as!aggressors!may!not!always!act!in!rational,!self\interested!ways.!However!in! the! case! of! Nikita! Khrushchev,! it! was! clear! he! was! pragmatic! in! the! way! he!calculated!risks!and!benefits!against!challenging!the!vital!interests!of!an!adversary.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Arnold!L.!Horelick!and!Myron!Rush,!Strategic'Power,'p.126.!
! 92!
Kennedy’s! deterrence! policy! was! successful! as! an! immediate! deterrence!policy! as! it! stopped! an! imminent! challenge! on! Berlin.! This! does! not! take! into!account! later!developments! in! the!Cold!War,!as! immediate!deterrence! is! focused!on! stopping! discernible! imminent! challenges! rather! than! future! possibilities.! By!making! Berlin! the! focus,! Kennedy’s! policy! was! confined! to! the! city! and! to! the!challenge!of!U.S.!access!rights!and!West!Berlin’s!freedom.!In!relation!to!the!Cuban!Missile! Crisis,! Kennedy’s! actions! were! not! the! result! of! the! failure! of! U.S.!deterrence!but!rather!an!attempt!by!the!Soviets!to!balance!out!general!deterrence.!In! other!words,!worrying! about! the! U.S.! ICBM! superiority! forced! Khrushchev! to!seek!out!ways!for!the!U.S.S.R.!to!achieve!a!situation!where!general!deterrence!for!both! sides! would! reach! its! equilibrium.! Installing! missiles! in! Cuba! fitted! that!purpose.!!!!This!dissertation!applied!a!theoretical!model!of!deterrence!to!demonstrate!that! Kennedy! acted! in! line!with! the!model! and! that! he! succeeded! in! Berlin! as! a!result.!Kennedy’s!deterrence!policy!effectively!met!an!imminent!Soviet!challenge;!therefore! Kennedy’s! Flexible! Response! was! an! effective! deterrence! policy.!Developing! the! necessary! credibility! through! the! effective! completion! of!deterrence! criteria,! Kennedy’s! Flexible' Response! deterrence! policy! successfully!deterred! Khrushchev! from! continuing! his! challenge! on! the! U.S.! commitment! in!West! Berlin.! Kennedy! and! Khrushchev! drew! back! from! the! brink,! however! the!winter!was!far!from!over.!!!
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